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ABSTRACT 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) has acknowledged climate change as 
a risk national security. Ongoing impacts include the loss of training and 
operational sites to climate hazards. Operationally, conflict and natural disasters 
around the world have been exacerbated by increasing heat, desertification, and 
flooding. Increasing average temperatures, the flagship issue of climate change, 
is a significant contributor to heat-illness in military personnel. This project 
explores the relationship between climate change and the U.S. military, ongoing 
efforts to evaluate and address the risk, and the overall impacts on training 
readiness.  
 Measuring climate related vulnerability is a complex process. For the DoD 
to apply a common framework across a vast network of fundamentally different 
sites is an especially wicked problem. I recommend a tiered approach to 
iteratively narrow the focus and resources allocated to the most mission critical 
and at-risk sites. The process begins with a screening survey, continues to in-
 vii 
depth site-specific impact assessments, and ends with implementation of 
technical and institutional adaptations. Recent efforts by the DoD have not fully 
executed this process and resulting reports are resultingly insufficient. 
I identify a lack of consideration for heat stress on servicemembers. Using 
historical site data and projections, I determine that the risk of heat-illness and 
lost training time will increase. Leaders can use this data to plan risk mitigation 
efforts through changing training locations, timing, or control measures. The 
military must continue to adapt and overcome challenges of the coming century 
by using available scientific information to reduce risk during the planning 
process. 
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GLOSSARY 
Adaptation: Physical and non-physical changes implemented to reduce the 
susceptibility of a system to one or multiple hazards (Smit and Wandel, 2006). 
Adaptive Capacity: Measure of society’s ability to adjust to the potential impacts 
of climate change” [or another problem] (IPCC, 2014). 
Black Flag Day: A day in which the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature exceeds 95° F 
for at least one hour. 
Exposure: Extent to which something is in contact with or subject to climate 
variations or changes, including derivative effects such as sea-level rise (adapted 
from Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) 
2013). 
Force Projection: (DOD) The ability to project the military instrument of national 
power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for 
military operations. 
Hazard: (DOD) A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of 
personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. 
Installation: a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any 
ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the DoD; must consist of one or 
more real property sites 
 xvi 
Readiness: The ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of 
assigned missions. 
Resiliency: The capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope 
with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in 
ways that maintain their essential function, identity, and structure” (Hewitson et 
al., 2014). 
Risk: (DOD) Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 
Site: DoD sites are defined as the physical (geographic) location that is, or was 
owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by a DoD Component on behalf of 
the United States. 
Threat: (DOD) Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the 
capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national 
interests, or the homeland. 
Threat Multiplier: A condition that accelerates or otherwise exacerbates existing 
threats. Here specifically, a condition which makes conflict, poverty, and loss 
more likely, thus reducing the security of nations (Goodman et al., 2007) 
Vulnerability: The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.  
 xvii 
Wicked Problem: An ill-defined problem which requires constant resolution; 
defining the problem itself is usually part of the problem (Horst and Webber, 
1973). 
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CHAPTER ONE: CLIMATE IMPACTS ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
1.1 Introduction 
The future national security environment will be shaped, in part, by the 
consequences of a globally changing climate. Acting as an “accelerant of 
instability or conflict,” these changes will affect the United States Military both at 
home and abroad (Goodman et al., 2007; U.S. DoD, 2010). The U.S. climate-
security relationship is as complex as the varying definitions of security and can 
include myriad cascading effects of climate related changes. Narrowing the 
scope of the issue to military readiness, the nexus can be understood in three 
parts. The first part includes the impacts of climate related changes and extreme 
weather events on military sites and installations. The second involves climate 
changes impact on training through limitations and new requirements. Third is 
the complex interplay of instability around the world to which the U.S. military 
may have to respond with aid or force. Through the “globalization of hazards” the 
impacts of sudden climate events can affect the economy, politics and food 
availability around the world suggesting that domestic and international impacts 
are not mutually exclusive (Sternberg, 2012). Increasingly adverse climate 
conditions can drive migration in conjunction with conflict or crop failure 
(Missirian and Schlenker, 2017).  Risks to the homeland and threats to bases 
could limit the military’s ability to project power around the world. Increasing 
temperatures and extreme weather increase the risk to servicemembers in 
training and during combat or other deployed missions. 
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1.1.1 Domestic Impacts 
Climate projections and analysis suggest that changes such as extreme 
drought, increasingly frequent heat waves, desertification, flooding and extreme 
weather events will continue to occur and these changes can undermine military 
readiness (U.S. DoD, 2018a; USGCRP, 2018; Carmen & Rogers, 2010). These 
impacts could disrupt operations across more than 500 active global installations, 
frustrate supply lines, and inflict heavy costs on reconstruction and infrastructure 
upgrades (U.S. DoD, 2018a). Additionally, shocks to the global energy market 
will impact the Department of Defense (DoD) which is the single largest 
consumer of energy in the world (Carmen et al., 2010). 
The United States is comparatively more resilient to the negative 
ramifications of climate change than many other nations. With a substantial 
economy, functional government, and established infrastructure, the adaptive 
capacity of the United States and the U.S. military are significant. They are well 
poised to manage changing environmental conditions. However, these 
adaptations will come at a cost. A recent survey of military installations revealed 
that half of all DoD sites are vulnerable to at least one climate change related 
condition (U.S. DoD, 2018a). The costs of these impacts are difficult to measure, 
and attributing climate change to individual events is still a contested topic 
(Bindoff, et al., 2013). However, with improved models and increased awareness 
of these climate risks, agencies can more accurately assess risk and implement 
adaptive measures to remain resilient and reduce damage costs. 
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1.1.2 Operational Impacts 
In the operational sphere, the response to climate change ranges from 
natural disaster response to bolstering foreign militaries’ capacity to combat 
instability which can be exacerbated by worsening climatic conditions. 
Additionally, the U.S. military must be prepared to operate anywhere its interests, 
or the interests of the nation’s allies are at stake. This includes places where 
extreme heat is already a factor and could include many coastal mega-cities 
which will face average sea level rise of about two meters by 2100 (U.S. DoD, 
2010; Church et al., 2013). It also includes the Arctic where melting sea ice is 
increasing the opportunities for global competition of resources and mobility 
among global competitors like Russia and China, both of which are increasing 
their Arctic capable fleets and plan to extract resources from newly exposed 
source (PRC, 2018; Nominations, 2018). The extent of U.S. involvement in these 
areas varies based on the geopolitical context and does not always consist of a 
military option but responses will impact national security. 
While climate change has not yet been considered a causal factor in 
interstate conflict or in most intrastate conflicts, it has become known as a conflict 
multiplier – something that exacerbates tensions in areas prone to conflict 
(Goodman et al., 2007). One of the most poignant examples of the conflict-
multiplier theory is the 2007-2010 drought in Syria and the escalation of conflict 
leading to civil war. The 2007-2010 drought is the most significant drought on 
instrumental record and caused severe crop failure and sky rocketing food 
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prices. Though no single factor can be said to cause conflict of this scale, the 
ramifications of the drought contributed to the discontent in the country (Kelley et 
al., 2015). In addition, increased internal migration to cities stressed 
infrastructure which was already impacted by a decade of conflict in neighboring 
Iraq. Many of the policies of the Al-Assad regime and the lack of food and water 
resources exacerbated the political unrest within the now crowded cities and 
outlying areas. Opponents of the regime capitalized on this and contributed to the 
rise of the civil war (Gleick, 2014). This in turn bred the rise of organizations such 
as the Islamic State and committed increased numbers of American forces to the 
region (Kelley et al., 2015).  
1.1.3 Thesis Outline 
This chapter outlines the various national security implications of climate 
change. It begins with a review of seminal works in the environmental security 
field and more recent literature on the climate-security nexus. The chapter 
includes matters both related and unrelated to military security and is more 
broadly focused than the following two chapters which describe the impacts of 
climate change on the DoD mission. Following the literature review, it explores 
climate risk as described by the Fourth National Climate Assessment and how 
climatic shocks have cascading effects in the U.S. economy and infrastructure. 
The latter part of the chapter is framed by the Trump Administration’s national 
security strategy’s focus on great power competition. It addresses the impacts to 
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energy, food, and water security and the resultant possibility of conflict, 
migration, or human insecurity outside the United States.  
Chapter Two considers the impact of climate variability on U.S. military 
installations. The DoD continues to develop and implement a variety of climate 
risk reduction actions including vulnerability assessments. This chapter reviews 
the evolution of vulnerability assessments and applies several fundamentals to a 
proposed framework for the DoD. The chapter reviews the scientific and practical 
approaches of categorizing exposure and implementing resiliency measures and 
recommends metrics for a vulnerability assessment. It also discusses the most 
recent, as of 2019, vulnerability assessment released by the DoD. It considers 
the apparent methodology, shortcomings, and opportunities it presents.  
Chapter Three considers a different type of vulnerability than those 
explored in the previous chapter. While most of the DoD effort involves 
installation level assessments for infrastructure and land, this analysis focuses on 
the human dimension of risk. It narrows in scope to address the challenges to 
small units and soldiers who must live, train, and deploy to and from areas 
impacted by climate risks, namely extreme heat. Using wet bulb globe 
temperature (WBGT) calculations and projections, it identifies regions and bases 
in the U.S. that are experiencing lost training days and risk of hot weather 
injuries. This is especially important for basic military training organizations and 
sites. This analysis has the potential to be expanded to all sites and can 
influence the human aspect of future vulnerability assessments.  
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1.2 Evolution of Environmental and Climate Security 
1.2.1 Environmental and Resource Security 
 The concept of resource scarcity leading to disagreement which can lead 
to conflict is not new nor unimaginable. One can envision a crowded supermarket 
on the eve of a great blizzard where frenzied shoppers aggressively claim cases 
of water and other essential items. In a more academic light, this argument can 
be seen between the neo-Malthusians and more optimistic economists (Homer-
Dixon, 1999, 29). The debate about whether limited natural resources will lead to 
the inevitable downfall of a growing civilization or if advances in technology and 
policy will be able to overcome these limitations drove much of the early work on 
environmental security. Later work reflects how the scarcity-conflict dynamic 
changes in a world where the finite resources vary geographically or seasonally 
due to long run shifts in climate variables. 
In testing whether these same human behaviors translate to the national 
or sub-national collective scale, Thomas Homer-Dixon and other early scholars 
conducted analysis on whether environmental scarcity contributed to violent 
conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999, 6). Figure 1 depicts Homer-Dixon’s core model of 
environmental scarcity and violence. If there is a correlation between scarcity and 
violence, is it an important or strong enough causal relationship for policy makers 
to act? For many of the conflicts in the late 20th century, scarcity was a clear 
contributing factor to social and political causes of conflict. Examples include the 
deforestation of Haiti, the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras, 
7 
and the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War of 1972–1973 (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Westing, 
1986).  
The focus on environmental security writ large preceded today’s focus on 
climate-related security concerns which assess this scarcity through the lens of a 
rapidly and globally changing climate. Within the security policy community both 
government and non-government groups have conducted research on the 
emerging relationship between climate and security. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has also addressed the topic on several occasions. In 2007, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called the first UNSC 
meeting on the security risks of climate change (United Nations, 2007). It raised 
concerns about migration and border disputes, energy and other resource 
shortfalls, and humanitarian crises and social stresses. Despite early debate on 
Figure 1: Core Model of Environmental Scarcity and Violence. From Homer-Dixon, 1999 
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the alignment of climate change within the purview of the security council, the 
organization has since held open debates and included climate risks in at least 
five other security resolutions (United Nations, 2019). 
U.S. Government agencies addressing the issue include the National 
Intelligence Council, DoD, and White House (Fingar, 2008; U.S. DoD, 2010; 
White House, 2017). Their studies often rely on or are supported by work from 
think tanks and foreign research institutions like the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo. The purpose of the various government studies mostly concerns increasing 
the state’s ability to adapt or respond to new or recurring challenges outside the 
United States, but also includes threats to domestic vulnerabilities. 
The DoD first considered environmental security by creating the office of 
the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security in 1993 
(Goodman, 2018). Their role was focused on the remediation of military lands 
and compliance with the growing number of environmental regulations (Briggs, 
2012). Over time, the department has restructured the office which at times 
included separate offices for energy and installations management.  
1.2.2 Climate Security 
For more than a decade, the U.S. military has conducted and sponsored 
research into the impacts of a changing climate on its mission (Schwartz and 
Randall, 2003; Johnson, 2007). While the concept of environmental security and 
resource scarcity-influenced conflict was well underway in the academic sphere 
(see landmark compilation study by Homer-Dixon, 1999), military discourse 
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began in earnest following the 2007 Military Advisory Board of the CNA 
Corporation. CNA Corporation, a nonprofit institution that conducts in-depth, 
independent research and analysis, assembled a panel of retired senior military 
officials who together authored a report classifying climate change as a risk to 
national security (Goodman et al., 2007). This report opened the dialogue about 
climate change’s impacts on missions abroad and at home.  
 The year following the seminal CNA report, the 2008 National Defense 
Strategy included climate change as a risk requiring mitigation and the follow on 
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) included a section on climate and 
energy, and the risks posed to military facilities and installations (U.S. DoD, 
2008; U.S. DoD, 2010). The 2014 QDR states, “operational readiness hinges on 
unimpeded access to land, air, and sea training and test space.” Range land 
enables units to develop and refine skills and integrate equipment that will aid in 
achieving victory (U.S. DoD, 2014a). The DoD continues to analyze these risks 
to global installations posed by rising sea levels, drought, extreme weather, and 
other climate events (U.S. DoD, 2018a). 
 This report also examines the impact of climate change on global military 
operations. The 2010 QDR states that “climate change will shape the operating 
environment, roles, and missions that we undertake” (U.S. DoD, 2010). Among 
the threats the report lists are increased poverty, environmental degradation, 
migration, and spread of disease. One essential fact in their examination of the 
response to climate change is that in some countries, the military is the only 
10 
 
institution able to respond to large scale natural disasters or humanitarian crises 
(U.S. DoD, 2010). Through military to military relationships those countries may 
seek support from the U.S. military which possesses significant worldwide logistic 
capabilities and has historically provided aid in these situations.  
1.3 Modern Securitization of Climate Change  
The “securitization” of climate change has evolved since the initial work of 
Thomas Homer-Dixon. Since then, various quantitative studies have been 
commissioned to tie internal conflict with specific climate change factors (Busby 
2016; Burke, Hsaing, and Miguel, 2015; Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014; Maystadt 
and Ecker, 2014). Beyond specific causal relationships, researchers and policy 
makers began discussing a broader correlation of increased human 
displacement from either climate induced conflict or climate disruptions to 
livelihoods and implied security risks from that migration. The 2014 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report contained 
an entire chapter on human security in the wake of these studies (Busby 2016).  
By attaching the label of “security” to climate change, advocacy groups 
can draw attention to the issue and gain political support. In today’s volatile, 
uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world, non-state actors are 
increasingly recognized as threats to national security. National defense 
spending receives a significant portion of the federal budget and it is politically 
advantageous to support most efforts to increase national security, which is 
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considered a common good. Under these conditions, connecting climate change 
risks with national security draws both interest and funding.  
This trend risks militarizing the threat of climate change when it is not 
strictly a military issue. Some conflicts and impacts can be better managed 
through humanitarian assistance, state department activities, and international 
agreements. However, researchers including Jorgenson and Clark (2016) posit 
that the increased use and maintenance of an industrialized military add to the 
“treadmill of destruction” by consuming resources and polluting more carbon 
dioxide and other materials. In this light, military involvement to solve or mitigate 
the effects of climate change around the world could be counterproductive. It is 
for these reasons that climate change can be appropriately “securitized” but 
should not be “militarized” (Muniruzzaman, 2019). 
1.4 Domestic National Security Implications 
 Threats to the security of the United States need not come from direct 
attacks by hostile countries or non-state actors. Natural hazards cause human 
casualties and can disrupt the functioning of government and business which will 
have broader economic effects (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that increasing the 
resilience of critical infrastructure is essential to national security. This sentiment 
is echoed in the National Intelligence Council’s 2015 report on climate change 
which also indicates economic losses due to coastal inundation, insurance 
premiums, and reduced physical labor capacity due to heat (National Intelligence 
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Council, 2015). The cascading effects of changes in temperature, precipitation, 
weather patterns, and sea level demonstrate the complex and integrated system 
of risks. This is one way to understand the cumulative impacts of climate change 
on the U.S. homeland. Integrated systems carry the impacts across regional as 
well as sectoral borders. 
Acknowledging the need to understand and prepare for these complex 
risks, the United States has several policies and organizations in place to study 
and present information regarding climate risks. Despite the politicization of 
climate change and other environmental issues over the previous decades, 
several policy actions continue to capture the ongoing threat of climate to the 
Nation. Through a series of reports, congressional inquiries, and after-action-
reviews, formal and informal organizations can further the public knowledge of 
climate related risks. Federal agencies like the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) record and implement lessons learned from previous events. 
However, the most comprehensive program to assess these risks is the U.S. 
Global Change Research Group (USGCRP) established in 1990. 
The Global Change Research Act (GCRA) was developed to coordinate “a 
comprehensive and integrated United States research program which will assist 
the Nation and the world to understand, assess, predict, and respond to human-
induced and natural processes of global change” (USGCRP, 2018). Through the 
programs it created, this act requires publication of a scientific assessment no 
less than every four years. This report is the National Climate Assessment (NCA) 
13 
and the second volume of the fourth and most recent version was published in 
November 2018 (USGCRP, 2018).   
Volume II of the report describes the impacts and risks of climate change 
and variability on the United States. The volume is divided into chapters which  
address risks by region and national topic. The regions are depicted in Figure 2. 
These specific topics correlate to various sectors deemed “critical infrastructure” 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This means that major disruption 
to their functionality would have a debilitating effect on national security (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The integrated nature of the U.S. 
economy and infrastructure increase the criticality of several systems. The 
Figure 2: US Regions from USGCRP NCA4, 2017. https://www.globalchange.gov/files/
nca4-regionsjpg 
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section below describes two of the sectors impacted by climate that are critical to 
national security; energy distribution and urban centers. 
1.4.1 Energy Systems 
The energy sector of the United States is essential in that it enables the 
operation of all other critical infrastructure sectors and the functioning of the US 
economy (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Much of the U.S. 
energy infrastructure is aging and subject to power outages caused by extreme 
weather or increased demand during heatwaves, which may become more 
frequent in the changing environment (U.S. Department of Energy, 2015). 
Heatwaves are projected to increase across all regions of the United States 
which will increase the demand of cooling while reducing the capacity of 
generation and transmission systems that supply energy to the end users (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2015). This is a public health concern which affects the 
human security of the nation’s most vulnerable populations. These energy 
systems also power important security and economic resources.  
1.4.2 Built Environment and Critical Infrastructure 
The United States population is roughly 80% urban and those urban 
metropolises require infrastructure such as plumbing, transportation, and public 
health networks (Maxwell et al., 2018). Most cities are dynamic, aged, and socio-
economically diverse, all conditions which provide both vulnerabilities and 
resiliency. As cities expand and grow, the opportunity to incorporate newly 
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understood climate risks increases as long as the rate of growth does not exceed 
the ability of public and private investments. If urbanization rates surpass the 
speed at which new infrastructure can fairly and comprehensively be constructed 
or modernized, cities will find themselves more vulnerable than before, despite 
increased foresight (Maxwell et al., 2018). Updating a single system or only a few 
systems will still leave the vastly interconnected modern infrastructure 
vulnerable. A failure in one sector could lead to cascading effects which limit the 
economic production of goods and services in the cities. Cities, especially those 
along the Gulf Coast, house a significant portion of the energy and transportation 
infrastructure which, when disabled, has ripple effects on the distribution of 
goods and services to the rest of the country (Houser et al., 2015). Examples of 
these impacts were clearly visible during Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy and Harvey. 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 remains the most expensive and devastating 
tropical cyclone to strike the United States and provided an important lesson on 
defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in the response efforts (NOAA, 2018). 
More than 36,000 national guard and federal troops performed a variety of 
missions including evacuation assistance, search and rescue, security, food and 
fuel distribution, medical care, law-enforcement support, clean up, and the 
rebuilding of damaged infrastructure (Davis et al., 2007). The response was 
largely considered a near failure due to lack of coordination between state and 
federal forces (Government Accountability Office, 2012). However, lessons 
learned from the event were successfully incorporated into future responses, 
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most notably Hurricane Sandy which also required the activation of both national 
guard and federal troops. 
Further impacts on the interconnected critical infrastructure system were 
seen during Hurricane Sandy which struck the mid-Atlantic, causing significant 
damage to New York City. Storm surge flooding disrupted air and subway travel 
and left residents and travelers without these systems for several days. 
Disruption to delivery of fuel supplies limited gas station inventories and coupled 
with high levels of debris to further reduce the mobility of people within the city 
(Blake et al., 2013).  
In late August 2017, Hurricane Harvey inundated the greater Houston, 
Texas area with devastating wind and rain. With over a meter of rain per day in 
some parts of the state, Hurricane Harvey caused $125 billion in damages and 
80 fatalities (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017; NOAA NCEI, 2017). Second only to 
Hurricane Katrina ($161 billion), Harvey demonstrated the vulnerability of major 
coastal cities and the country writ large to expected increasingly powerful storms 
(Bindoff, et al., 2013). A 2017 study found that the intensity of rainfall increased 
by roughly 15% in the area impacted by Hurricane Harvey over the course of the 
storm (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017). The study used historical rain gauge data 
and models with a generalized extreme value distribution to estimate the 
increased likelihood and severity of the storm using recorded events. This 
increased exposure to climate events will have severe impacts on aged coastal 
infrastructure. 
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Much of Houston, the fourth largest U.S. city, is built in historical 
floodplains. While the buildings are designed to meet minimum elevation and 
construction standards, these regulations may not stand up to changing climate 
and subsidence events (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017). Cascading effects from 
flood waters damaged essential power and transportation networks which in turn 
reduced the capacity of emergency responders to assist and often forced 
lifesaving emergency responders to use boats or high-water trucks (FEMA, 
2017).  
Homeland disaster response and recovery are not new missions, but they 
are further complicated with changing climate risks. Increasing property value 
only raises the cost of intensifying storms and drought fueled wildfires. The costs 
of responding to these risks is increasingly well documented while the costs of 
resilience and adaptation measures are harder to capture (Weiss and Weidman, 
2013). Increasing domestic threats may pull additional military and other 
homeland defense assets away from protecting borders or preparing for other 
defense focused operations. In a time when the presidential administration has 
proclaimed a focus on great power competition and protecting the homeland from 
kinetic threats (cyber, transnational crime, terrorism), these emerging threats will 
continue to detract from defense institution’s readiness (Whitehouse, 2017). 
1.5 The 2017 National Security Strategy in the Anthropocene 
In the 2017 National Security Strategy, many who already recognized 
climate change as a risk to national security balked at the removal of the threat 
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from the document- a marked turn from that of the previous administration (White 
House, 2017; Langevin and Stefanik, 2017). Among them were 106 members of 
the House of Representatives who signed a letter to the President reaffirming 
their belief that climate change poses a risk to national security. That belief was 
codified in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which was 
signed by President Trump (U.S. Congress, 2017). Despite an affirmation on the 
topic by senior defense officials leading up to this point, the National Defense 
Strategy (the follow up document which outlines the DoD’s contributions to 
achieving the NSS) also leaves out the words “climate change” (U.S. DoD, 
2018b). 
The strategy documents1 instead pivot to focusing on the reemergence of 
great power competition. This does not, however, ignore important climate 
related national security problems. Researchers at the American Security Project 
identify three key impacts of climate change on national security through the lens 
of great power competition.  First, shifts in the international world order will be 
exacerbated by the changing climate. For example, increased sea routes through 
the melting Arctic are expected to have competing claims by both Arctic nations 
as well as non-arctic nations like China (American Security Project, 2018). 
Second, climate change will most significantly impact those states which lack 
                                            
1 It should be noted that the documents referenced here and generally available to the public are 
the unclassified summaries of much larger and detailed classified documents. The contents of 
those documents are not known to most, including the author, and no assumptions are made 
about their contents here. 
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internal capacity to adapt or have ineffective governance (Moran et al., 2018). 
These states are vulnerable not only to climate change but also to neighboring 
great powers which can assert influence through climate-related aid and 
development (American Security Project, 2018). Lastly, the homeland of the 
United States is not as protected as it once was based on emerging threats 
(White House, 2017; American Security Project, 2018). The ability of adversaries 
to conduct cyber-attacks against energy grids (especially during peak demand 
periods), increased habitat for disease vectors, and increased frequency of 
extreme weather events all increase the vulnerability of the United States.  
Among the greatest threats remain China and Russia as well as North 
Korea, Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). This “four-plus-one” 
problem set has been used to identify the top adversarial priorities over the last 
few years (White House, 2017). National security and foreign affairs in 
themselves are comprised of wicked problems and the impact of these relations 
and climate security on each other are complex. The effects of increasing 
drought, desertification, intense storms, and sea level rise (all correlated with a 
changing climate) will affect these countries and their satellite states differently 
(Goodman et al., 2007). Even if a country is spared the worst of the impact or 
remains resilient, less developed and unstable countries in which they have 
interests are likely to be significantly affected.  
Part of the focus on great power competition includes the emergence of 
the “competitive space” concept (NDS, 2018). The competitive space is not 
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specifically defined in the NDS or in Secretary of Defense Mattis’ comments upon 
the document’s release, but it can be inferred to mean any and all areas in which 
the great powers vie for influence and resources (Mattis, 2018). This is indicated 
by the mention of interagency cooperation including Departments of State and 
Energy, the USAID, and others and in relation to technology, alliance building, 
and generally operating below the level of armed conflict until escalation is 
inevitable (NDS, 2018). It is in this competitive space that China, Russia, and the 
United States compete for both resources and influence. These resources and 
opportunities to influence other states and non-state actors are susceptible to 
changing climate conditions. The following section describes the intersection of 
climate change and the competitive space with a focus on China (competitor), 
VEOs (instability), and the Arctic (new arenas of competition). 
1.5.1 China and Power Competition  
China leads the world in population size and carbon emissions and is 
seeking to lead in other areas as well. The ongoing Belt and Road initiatives are 
projecting influence across the Asian landmass. Additionally, China continues to 
aggressively assert claims to land and sea area off their coast, claiming 
resources in contested waters. Their rapid growth is resource intensive and has 
strained their domestic sources of water and food, especially in increasingly 
common drought conditions. 
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In 2011, China’s First Policy document, which outlines the major priorities 
for the year, declared the protection and improved access to water as 
paramount. China's per capita water availability is low and unevenly distributed 
(Jiang, 2015). Water availability is largely driven by precipitation cycles of the 
monsoon climate which can drop 70% of a province’s rainfall over the four-month 
rainy season (PRC MWR, 2007). The intensity of rainfall during this short wet-
period is expected to increase under varying emissions scenarios while the time 
between agricultural droughts decreases and their length increases (Leng et al., 
2015). The population and agricultural centers of China, the fourth largest 
country by land mass and the country with the largest population, vary in density 
and location across a heterogeneous landscape. The impacts of drought will not 
be evenly distributed, but the cumulative effect will have ramifications for the 
whole country. Increased occurrence and severity of agricultural drought will 
continue to impact the agricultural sector which will in turn have impacts on the 
country’s GDP and food security (Leng et al., 2015).  
In addition to their local sphere of influence and resource claims, China 
considers itself an important stakeholder in the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state” 
(PRC, 2018). This is not a legal classification found in any of the international 
treaties cited by China in a 2018 government white paper. They base their status 
on their relative geography and the fact that they have conducted research in the 
Arctic for more than a decade and are now expanding their trade enterprises into 
the Arctic circle. This has been combined with their cross-continental Belt and 
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Road initiative and is deemed their “Polar Silk Road” (PRC, 2018). In addition to 
trade, China is also investing in other countries that border the Arctic like Russia 
and their Yamal Liquid Natural Gas project (Sun, 2018). While many countries 
placed embargoes on Russia following the 2014 events in Ukraine, China was 
able to use its vast economic resources to capitalize on opportunities there.  
China will continue to be a competitor in the near future as both their 
population and economy grow and require resources in a climate constrained 
world. Their actions will continue to shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
and around the world where they assert their influence. Growing military 
capabilities also increase the risk of their involvement in conflicts or in support of 
fragile states where conditions are worsened by climate change. This increases 
the opportunities for United States and Chinese competition (or cooperation) 
similar to that seen with Russia and the current situation in Syria.  
 1.5.2 “Breeding Grounds” of Violent Extremist Organizations –   
 Fragile governance and high exposure to climate extremes are a 
compounding risk in which higher incidences of conflict are seen (Moran et al., 
2018). States with already high exposure will need to allocate more resources to 
adapt to changes and provide relief for those affected. In states where 
governance is already perceived as illegitimate or ineffective, the availability or 
willingness to allocate resources to stressed populations may not occur (Moran 
et al., 2018). This contributes to the common conception that those who are most 
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negatively affected by changes in climate through loss of livelihoods are more 
susceptible to join violent organizations and take part in conflict (Wischnath and 
Buhaug, 2014). Lack of effective government assistance when agricultural yields 
fail and a lack of opportunity to change to other sources of income reduces the 
opportunity cost of joining an armed group.   
These groups are normally already established and funded and can 
provide short term economic and social functions that a fragile government in a 
strained environment cannot (Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014). As the number of 
recruits increases, the legitimacy of the rebel organization in the eyes of the 
distraught populace also serves to reduce barriers to entry into these 
organizations. This is particularly true if the growing population of the rebel 
movement shares ethnic, religious, or ideological identities (Weinstein, 2006). In 
testing these theories, Weintstein and Buhaug (2014) find that there is a 
significant negative correlation between food production and conflict related 
casualties in India from 1982 to 2011 (Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014). However, 
the strength of the relationship varies based on the lag of time between the poor 
production and conflicts, especially if there are several poor harvests in 
succession. The relationship is also susceptible to problems of endogeneity as 
increased conflict can reduce food availability and workers available to contribute 
to the harvest. In this sense, insecurity begets more conflict. States subject to 
these problems and increased climate strains are vulnerable to humanitarian 
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crises and instability associated with local and global violent actors (Moran et al., 
2018). 
1.5.3 The Arctic and a Changing Environment 
“The United States has unique and critical interests in the Arctic region, related 
directly to national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry, 
and environmental protection” – National Security Decision Directive 90: United 
States Arctic Policy, 1983 
 
In his senate confirmation hearing in April 2018, General Terrance J. 
O’Shaughnessy, Commander of United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), stated, “as we look to the future, look at the strategic competition 
we’re in, look at Russia and China, and their activities [in the Arctic], that is 
clearly something that we need to also be focused on” (Nominations, 2018). The 
opening of the Arctic due to increased melting and limited regeneration of ice 
cover during winter months is quickly creating an area of strategic competition.  
As noted in the above section which looked at China, there are concurrent 
economic, military, and environmental concerns about access and dominance in 
the Arctic.  
Increased rates of sea ice melt in the Arctic are opening lanes for 
movement of goods and military assets. Melting ice also exposes valuable 
natural resources which countries will seek to extract. This competition increases 
the risk of environmental disasters. With increased activity the need for support 
systems such as navigational aids, communications, and search and rescue 
procedures will become paramount (U.S. DoD, 2016a). 
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The increase in mobility capabilities, despite the melting of a significant 
portion of ice, is still essential for year-round navigation. Developed countries 
which border the Arctic and Antarctica generally have at least one polar security 
cutter (ships formerly known as “icebreakers”). Table 1 lists the number of polar 
security cutters capable vessels each of the eighteen countries with at least one 
possesses (USCG, 2017).  In addition to these, many countries have already 
planned for additional ice breaking assets which are scheduled for launch 
between 2020 and 2026. The disparity between Russia and NATO countries and 
the rapidly increasing fleet of Chinese vessels is often noted as a point of 
concern.  
Table 1: Shows number of polar security cutters by country. Asterisks (*) indicate some of 
the vessels are designed for Baltic use only. Not all non-NATO allies are considered 
regional competitors. Source: USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, 2017. 
 
 
Country # of Vessels Vessels with Arctic Experience NATO Allies 
Canada  9 2 Yes 
USA 
Denmark 
Estonia 
5 
4* 
2* 
2 
0 
0 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Norway 2 0 Yes 
Germany 1 1 Yes 
Latvia 1* 0 Yes 
UK 1 0 Yes 
NATO Total 25 5  --- 
    
Russia 57* 6 No 
Finland 10* 0 No 
Sweden 7* 1 No 
China 4 0 No 
Australia 
Argentina 
2 
1 
0 
0 
No 
No 
Chile 1 0 No 
Japan 1 0 No 
South Africa 1 0 No 
South Korea 1 0 No 
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 Two days after General O’Shaughnessy’s testimony, Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral John Richardson stated that there was a vital need to update 
the navy’s Arctic strategy and Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer asserted 
many of the same concerns (Posture of the Department of the Navy, 2018).  
Keeping in-line with the new national security strategy, the new naval strategy 
would address the opening sea lanes and exposed continental shelves which 
could possess valuable natural resources (Posture of the Department of the 
Navy, 2018).  
One way in which the U.S. military is working with partnered nations to 
ensure stability and international interests in the Arctic is through multinational 
operations such as Operation Arctic Zephyr which is one of many table-top 
exercises focused on information sharing and coordination of military and civilian 
responses to natural or man-made disasters in that region (DoD, 2016a). 
International exercises like this have been conducted around the world including 
the Baltics and throughout the Pacific; both areas where geopolitical competition 
exists today. These exercises increase the ability of partnered nations to 
cooperate by strengthening relationships, communication procedures, common 
operating language and practices, and displaying commitment to similar 
priorities. One non-military cooperative is the Arctic Council. The council is an 
international forum created to foster coordination between the eight countries 
which border the Arctic to further scientific research and sustainability initiatives. 
Their charter explicitly excludes military security.  
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1.6 Conclusions 
The intersections of climate change and national security are broad and 
involve countless factors that complicate and obscure the linkages between the 
two. However, when studied across time and space, changing climatic conditions 
clearly increase the risks to national security at home and abroad. Increased 
temperatures, drought risk, and severe storms can damage domestic 
infrastructure including military bases while also increasing the likelihood of failed 
harvests and varying degrees of conflict in more fragile states. Political, 
economic, and socio-ethnic differences all contribute to the degree and extent to 
which the climate of a certain geography will be impacted, but through the 
globalized economy and porous borders in much of the world, no country will be 
unaffected.  
The following chapters more closely examine these domestic risks as they 
effect the DoD. The same threats to cities and rural areas affect the expansive 
military base complexes which are often reliant on local services. Training areas 
impact and are impacted by regional climate threats. Attempts to quantify these 
risks and determine the impact on each base’s mission are examined and 
compared to regional assessments and damage data. The final chapter 
considers the risk climate changes pose to fragile nations and the roll the military 
may play in those eventualities. Understanding where conflict and humanitarian 
stress are most likely through quantitative assessments and analysis can steer 
the planning and preparation of the military to ensure mission readiness. 
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CHAPTER 2: CLIMATE IMPACTS ON DOMESTIC U.S. MILITARY 
INSTALLATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
Military installations are vital to the readiness of the armed forces and the 
national security of the United States. These bases house service members, 
critical equipment, and a vast network of support systems. The U.S. military has 
more than 4,000 domestic sites covering more than 26.6 million acres of land 
(U.S. DoD, 2018a). These sites are spread across the 50 states, include large 
coastal navy bases, testing and training sites in the Southwest, radar and 
communication stations in the Arctic, and important headquarters in urban 
centers. Figure 3 below depicts the location of major military bases across the 
United States and shows that there are major bases in each of the regions 
delineated by the USGCRP. Each of these bases are susceptible to climate 
hazards of their respective region and must consider their vulnerability, 
resiliency, and integrated risk to their mission.  
These hazards impact the missions and support systems that bases 
provide. Readiness, a term used to describe the state of preparedness to 
accomplish an individual or unit mission, is essential to the military. Training is 
the cornerstone of readiness. Accordingly, the military must preserve the areas 
that service members need to train for their missions. Non-training installations 
also play a vital role in supplying units with equipment, ammunition, or new 
technology to protect and enhance the force in training and combat.  
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Figure 3: Map of US Military Installations Within the seven continental regions as 
defined by the US Global Change Research Program and National Climate Assessment 
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Based on unique missions and assets, installations are of varying 
criticality to the readiness of the military and, to varying extents, all are 
susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Their actual and relative 
vulnerability must be assessed and strategically remedied to preserve military 
dominance. Through the lens of readiness preservation, this chapter describes 
an iterative framework for DoD vulnerability and screening assessments that 
begins with identifying critical assets. Presence of these assets and their 
criticality are considered in addition to climate related hazards. This framework is 
nested in various mission assurance policies and the broader vulnerability and 
resiliency assessment literature. It considers DoD sponsored research, methods 
assessed by the IPCC, and recent attempts by the DoD to meet congressional 
assessment mandates.  
This chapter reviews the literature on vulnerability assessments and 
frames the definitions of vulnerability, risk, and resiliency in a defense and 
national security context. It then describes the exposure of the defense 
community to identified primary hazards: coastal and riverine flooding, drought 
and fire risk, and thawing permafrost (U.S. Congress, 2018). The impacts of 
these climate-related events on installations are described in terms of their 
impact on readiness as indicated by recent DoD reports. The crux of the chapter 
recommends a framework which merges mission readiness, critical assets, and 
climate vulnerability. This framework is then used to critique recent DoD reports 
and explore implementation techniques in ongoing governmental processes. 
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2.2 Literature Review and Definition of Terms 
Vulnerability and hazard assessments are used in various fields and have 
evolved over time (Füssel and Klein, 2006; Füssel, 2007; Hinkel, 2011; Moss et 
al., 2016). Establishing clear definitions of terms that may have different 
meanings in these fields is an essential first step to designing a framework by 
which the DoD and security practitioners can assess the risks from climate 
change to domestic installations and communicate those risks to policy makers. 
Various definitions and frameworks exist for vulnerability assessments in the 
military and related risk mitigation fields. These selected definitions draw from the 
international community via the IPCC reports and scholars with both civilian and 
military background.  
Once the definitions are established (also listed alphabetically in Glossary) 
this section will review the literature on previously created frameworks and DoD 
policy for understanding the interplay of environmental impacts on the defense 
organizations and systems. The various military commissioned studies reviewed 
suggest frameworks that use these definitions to methodically assess the bases 
comparative risk. 
2.2.1 Defining Climate Risk and the Evolution of Vulnerability Frameworks 
According to Hon. Sherri Goodman, former Undersecretary of Defense for 
Climate Security, the climate-security community has spent the last decade on 
the first step of accounting for and mitigating climate impacts. That step is 
problem identification – which includes clearly defining the language of the 
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practice (Goodman, 2018). Resiliency, vulnerability, adaptation, and adaptive 
capacity are terms that are defined and used in various fields from psychology to 
engineering to ecosystem studies (Matyas and Pelling, 2015). Several studies 
attempt to synthesize these terms and generate a common definition for use in 
vulnerability studies, specifically climate vulnerability assessments. However, the 
concepts and definitions of vulnerability and the component concepts related to it 
are vague and largely disputed (Hinkel, 2011). This is undoubtedly part of the 
problem the military has in clearly delineating the list of bases most vulnerable to 
climate change. 
An extensive review of efforts to define and model these effects exists in 
the Working Group II section of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Assessment Reports. The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), published in 
2013 & 2014, consists of three Working Groups. Working Group II focuses on the 
impacts, adaptation and vulnerabilities related to climate change. Their 
contribution to AR5 is in two parts – Global and Sectoral Aspects (Part A) and 
Regional Aspects (Part B). The introduction to Part B acknowledges the difficulty 
in defining vulnerability related terms due to the interconnectedness and usages 
across disciplines (Hewitson et al., 2014). AR5 defines resilience as “the capacity 
of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event 
or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their 
essential function [emphasis added], identity, and structure…” (Hewitson et al., 
2014). The essential element of resilience in this definition is that it is only truly 
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understood after an event. Essentially, resilience allows a system to return to 
steady state after a shock. A truly resilient system has the ability not just to 
recover but also to learn from and improve after a shock so that future shocks 
require less resources to return to a steady state (Hewitson et al., 2014). In this 
sense, resilience is the capacity to change in order to maintain the same identity. 
Resilience is important to military installations, some of which are 
comparable to small cities with thriving connections to surrounding municipalities. 
For this reason, urban resiliency is explored here to inform the working definition 
of resiliency as it relates to ongoing military vulnerability/resilience assessments. 
Meerow et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on urban 
resiliency. In doing so, they outline basic components that define an urban 
landscape. Cities are complex networked systems of governance, material and 
energy flows, infrastructure and form, and socio-economic dynamics (Meerow et 
al., 2015). The relationship between the internal aspects of these four dynamics 
varies across time and space which makes them complex-networks or a system 
of systems. A challenge acknowledged by the authors and many others is where 
to draw the boundary lines of the urban system and its surroundings. Meerow et 
al. defines urban resilience as “the ability of an urban system-and all its […] 
networks across temporal and spatial scales-to maintain or rapidly return to 
desired functions in the face of a disturbance…” (Meerow et al., 2015). This 
definition was crafted to include the various components of vulnerability identified 
as most important and most prevalent in a review of the literature.  
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With increasingly global networks, the connectedness of each urban 
center is expansive (Meerow et al., 2015). The same is true with military 
installations where most service members and staff live off-base and energy, 
supplies, and transportation networks all involve the surrounding area. Various 
bases also house technical equipment which interacts with combat and 
intelligence assets in contingency locations in real time. 
One important aspect of the resilience definition is that it includes the 
“capacity…to cope” or adaptive capacity. Referencing Füssel (2010), AR5 
defines adaptive capacity as the “measure of society’s ability to adjust to the 
potential impacts [emphasis added] of climate change” (IPCC, 2014). The 
difference between adaptive capacity and resilience, defined in this way, focuses 
on the time aspect of managing the risk. The ability to change in anticipation of 
probable events so that a system is not significantly affected by the shock is 
essential to adaptive capacity. 
Adaptations are manifestations of adaptive capacity (Smit and Wandel, 
2006). They are both physical and non-physical changes implemented to reduce 
the susceptibility of a system to one or multiple hazards. Adaptations can occur 
in either a bottom-up or top-down manner and can be minor adjustments or 
major resource intensive undertakings (Smit and Wandel, 2006; Hewitson et al., 
2014). In the military, these adaptations range from increasing the height of piers 
at major naval installations to increasing the frequency of training and rehearsals 
for deployments in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster response. 
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Defining vulnerability is perhaps the most allusive but important definition 
for the U.S. military. In simplest form, vulnerability is “the propensity or 
predisposition to be adversely affected” (IPCC, 2014). Vulnerability is a 
theoretical concept which lacks directly observable variables (Hinkel, 2011). To 
be measured, it must be operationalized through an agreed upon methodology 
which is used to measure and compare vulnerability indicators (compiled into an 
index) based on observable phenomenon (Hinkel, 2011; Hewitson et al., 2014). 
These variables must be relevant to the current and projected hazards and 
mitigating factors related to the system in question; in this case, military 
installations. Difficulty arises when impacts cannot be easily operationalized 
through monetary or other valuations. Risk is one method of alternate valuation 
and is widely used in the military for planning and assessment purposes. 
Füssel and Klein (2006) provide a succinct review of climate change 
vulnerability methodologies through 2006. Two of the prominent methods are 
described here. In the first, climate change vulnerability reflects the impact of the 
exogenous effects of the climate change stimuli and is known as the risk–hazard 
framework (Füssel and Klein, 2006). The other approach is defined by the social 
constructivist framework and believes vulnerability to be a characteristic of the 
system prior to any external climate change effects. Figure 4 depicts the social 
constructivist framework as adapted by Moss et. al. (2016). In this model, 
hereafter called the impact framework, vulnerability is a function of sensitivity 
(predisposition of the subject) and adaptive capacity (ability to reduce sensitivity 
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to exposures). A similar model is used in the AR5 Working Group II report 
(Hewitson et al., 2014). The IPCC model differentiates between hazards and 
exposure which are combined in this model. 
Figure 4: Social-Constructivist (Impact) Framework adapted in Moss et al., 2016. Impacts 
from exposures to a vulnerable (or resilient) system are assessed based on their relevance 
to the installation’s mission. (T=temperature; P=precipitation). 
These vulnerabilities are compared to local exposures (temperatures, 
extreme events, drought incidence etc.) resulting in impacts. The impacts are 
assessed by the degree to which they degrade mission readiness through 
training degradation, infrastructure damage, or risk to other critical functions 
(Moss et al., 2016). Ongoing sponsored work by SERDP and other national 
laboratories continue to refine the methodology for best assessing vulnerability 
across the DoD, but most follow this general concept.  
Removing exposure as an aspect of vulnerability helps to focus local 
decision makers on the dimensions of infrastructure they can manage through 
improved adaptive capacity (Moss et al., 2016). This also allows military 
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installation owners and stakeholders to include climate related vulnerability in a 
comprehensive risk assessment framework and not as a separate assessment 
process. Understanding whole system vulnerabilities and how climate may be a 
compounding factor is important to integrate and not isolate the understanding of 
climate risk. This understanding leads to increased adaptive capacity for 
installations across several sectors and hazards, not just those related to climate. 
2.2.2 Military vulnerability  
As described in Chapter One of this report, the military has considered the 
risks posed by climate change for more than a decade and across several 
administrations. The 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) stated 
that assessments concerning potential impacts of climate change on installations 
were either planned or underway (U.S. DoD, 2010; U.S. DoD, 2014a). Those 
early assessments came in the form of high-level screening assessments like the 
Screening Level Vulnerability Assessment Survey (SLVAS) released in 2018 
(U.S. DoD, 2018a). High-level assessments were influenced by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) and research sponsored by the DoD Strategic 
Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) (Hayden et al., 
2013; Moss et al., 2016). These high-level assessments were the first step, or 
tier, in identifying the most at-risk installations. 
Tier 1 Vulnerability Screening as defined in a 2016 report by the Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory (Moss et al., 2016) identifies where to prioritize 
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assessment resources. The three-tiered multi-criteria approach proposed by 
Moss et al. is depicted in Figure 5 and used throughout this chapter. 
Figure 5: Tiered, multi-criteria framework to vulnerability assessment from Moss et al., 
2016 
A high-level vulnerability screening is a department wide process and 
considers all sites based on common metrics (Moss et al., 2016). Part of the 
initial screening is establishing a baseline that considers past damages, 
preparedness, and general physical condition of each site. The screening 
process is conducted through surveys, input from local stakeholders, and 
analysis of existing coarse data to understand how these baseline conditions 
compare across all bases. It is useful in identifying the top priorities against 
which to align resources for both further assessment (tier 2) and adaptation 
design (tier 3) (Moss et al., 2016).
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Once sites are identified as vulnerable and prioritized, those selected 
receive additional resources to conduct a thorough site-tailored assessment. This 
may require external support and facilitation and is generally costlier than the first 
phase (Moss et al., 2016). Tier two should focus on applying expert knowledge to 
key vulnerabilities and identifying opportunities to remedy vulnerabilities in 
multiple sectors or systems. Local experts and data are essential to tailoring the 
assessment to best serve the site-specific impacts. For sites not identified for 
further assessment in the first tier, this phase can still consist of decentralized 
local assessments based on the results of the first survey. 
The final tier implements selected adaptations into ongoing planning and 
decision processes to minimize the impacts identified in earlier steps or exploit 
opportunities. The level of detail and data required to implement these actions 
are usually greater than the previous steps and the cost of action will generally 
be far greater than the cost of the assessment itself (Moss et al., 2016). 
The successive completion of each of these steps requires an increasing 
degree of detail and data quality. However, each step can use an iterative but 
scaled process for understanding impacts and risks. For this analysis, the impact 
framework described by Moss et al. is used for this purpose. In tier one, 
presence of mission critical assets, coarse data about historical events, site 
policies, and existing stakeholder relationships can be used to determine impacts 
important to the DoD as a whole. If selected, a site can use finer resolution data 
to identify the hazards and vulnerabilities that intersect to cause the greatest 
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impact and risk to mission accomplishment. Finally, the systems which require 
adaptation can use this same framework to assess potential responses and 
identify specific system related vulnerabilities. 
2.2.3 Risk frameworks 
This process is used to identify risk. Risk is a useful tool for analyzing 
future events with varying degrees of uncertainty. Risk assessments allow 
organizations to identify and compare impacts which may not be possible 
through traditional valuation processes or benefit-cost assessments. The goal of 
the risk assessment process for the DoD is to minimize the overall risk by 
reducing the likelihood or severity of impacts to mission critical assets. 
Risk is categorized based on the intersection of a hazard’s likelihood and 
severity. The likelihood is scaled from frequent to unlikely and severity ranges 
from catastrophic to negligible. An event that results in minimal loss or impact on 
mission readiness and is unlikely to occur is classified as low risk. A hazard that 
may occur sporadically or intermittently, like major floods, that result in severe 
damage or significantly degrade mission readiness would have a high risk. 
Figure 6 shows the Risk Assessment framework from Department of Defense 
Form 2977 (2014).  
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Figure 6: Risk Assessment Worksheet. A tool used for determining the risk of an event 
based on probability, from frequent to unlikely, and severity, from catastrophic to 
negligible.  Source: Department of Defense Form 2977 (2014) Retrieved from DA PAM 385-
30. 
The risk assessment framework and risk management are applied at all 
levels of DoD decision making. The army formalizes and describes the process 
in Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-30 (HQDA, 2014). The mission of the 
armed forces is inherently dangerous. Because of this, leaders and individual 
soldiers at the lowest echelons of the army conduct risk assessments in their 
daily operations. They identify, evaluate, and manage the risks posed by both 
threats and hazards and implement controls (HQDA, 2014). The significance of 
this process is that it enables leaders to identify risks without certainty of the 
probability or exact severity. Leaders can, and do, apply new knowledge about 
these metrics to adjust the overall risk level and the necessary risk controls. 
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By embedding risk awareness, evaluation, and management into all 
aspects of the army mission, the department already has a framework for which 
to measure the risks inherent in climate related hazards. Many of these hazards 
are already identified and mitigated daily during operations. However, as the 
increased severity and probability of these climate hazards increase, the controls 
and other mitigation efforts (including future planning) must respond to minimize 
the potential for loss. 
A USACE report conducted by Hayden et al. (2013) describes hazards 
identified in the Third National Climate Assessment (NCA) as they pertain to 
Army installations and the risk they present. The analysis uses the same regional 
delineation as the NCA to highlight the differing impacts and allow a wholistic 
government approach to these issues. Their report does not conduct an 
assessment or rank order any sites or regions as more or less vulnerable. 
Instead, it provides descriptions of the hazards and factors that make an 
installation vulnerable. These hazards, once understood, can be integrated into 
the iterative vulnerability assessment framework. 
2.3 Domestic Climate Security Concerns: Hazards 
The hazards identified in the recent NCAs and discussed in chapter one 
also affect the expansive military installations across the United States. Using the 
NCA, the SLVAS, and the DoD’s 2019 most vulnerable site report, the following 
five hazards are identified as the primary threats to bases in each of the military 
services: coastal and riverine flooding, drought and fire risk, and thawing 
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permafrost. These hazards are addressed below and include an assessment of 
how they vary across the regions and the potential impacts to security and 
readiness they pose. Related hazards are extreme temperature and precipitation 
events. These last two hazards were not mentioned by name in the NDAA 
mandate but were included in the SLVAS and recommended for inclusion by the 
other institutions (Udvardy, 2019; Conger, 2019). They directly influence the 
above hazards. A section on extreme weather events (precipitation and wind) is 
included here and the direct risk of increased temperature is examined in depth 
in the next chapter. 
2.3.1 Coastal flooding: Sea level rise and increased storm damage  
As early as 2008, the National Intelligence Council identified over 30 military sites 
in the continental United States that were already facing elevated risks because 
of sea level rise (U.S. National Intel. Council, 2008). Today, about ten percent of 
DoD coastal installations and facilities are located at or near sea level and are 
vulnerable to recurrent and catastrophic flooding (SERDP, 2013; U.S. DoD, 
2010). This threatens much of the Hampton Roads military region which is home 
to Naval Station Norfolk. Norfolk is the largest naval base and home of multiple 
carrier strike groups, commands, and maintenance facilities that support the 
Atlantic fleet (Dahl et al., 2016).  
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Table 2: Summary of hazards, vulnerabilities and associated mission 
impacts. 
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Seal level rise increases the incidence of sunny-day, or nuisance, flooding 
which is when high tide water temporarily floods low lying portions of developed 
land (U.S. DoD, 2019; Hino, 2017). With higher sea levels, storm events can 
transport more water inland in the form of storm surge and inundate a greater 
area than would be flooded in a similar event without raised sea levels. These 
floods damage infrastructure like utilities, buildings, and roads both on and 
leading into bases (Dahl et al., 2016). Related damages and disturbances lead to 
higher spending and decreased readiness. Numerous studies incorporated into 
the Fourth NCA describe the significant cost of adapting, rebuilding, and 
mitigating property damage along coastlines where property value is generally 
greater than inland property (Fleming et al., 2018; Hino et al., 2017). 
 Coasts are also essential training grounds for the marine corps which 
provides important amphibious and ground combat capabilities. Beach areas are 
essential to training amphibious landings and often also house other live fire 
range complexes. A 2015 study found that sea level rise could affect Marine 
Corps Base Pendleton in California where replacement value damages to coastal 
range and supporting infrastructure ranged from about $4 million for a baseline 
inundation scenario and up to $1.656 billion for a 2.0 m sea level rise flooding 
scenario (Chadwick et al., 2015). Parris Island in South Carolina is another major 
marine training installation threatened by sea level rise and associated flooding.  
The base is also susceptible to major hurricanes and has had to evacuate 
trainees based imminent storm damage during Hurricanes Floyd and Matthew. 
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2.3.2 Hurricanes and Storms 
Evidence suggests that climate change may make cyclones and other 
tropical storms more intense (Reed et al., 2016). The impact of these storms 
combined with a rising sea level was discussed in Chapter One. Hurricane 
Michael, a category four event that landed on the Florida panhandle on October 
10, 2018 resulted in damage to 95% of Tyndall Air Force Base, FL. The impacts 
are similar to Hurricane Andrew's destruction of Homestead Air Force Base in 
1992 (Readiness, 2018). The Airforce elected to not rebuild Homestead, instead 
relocating units and equipment to other locations (Conger and King, 2018). When 
Hurricane Florence struck North Carolina, it impacted Camp Lejune where 
damage estimates are currently $3.6 billion (Readiness, 2018). Much of the 
major new recruit training for the army and marine corps are affected by these 
storm events and follow on flooding. 
The Southeast isn’t the only part of the Unites States affected by off shore 
storm damage. A vital runway in Cape Lisburne, Alaska is subject to erosion from 
increasingly strong storms and changing sea-ice patterns which have eroded a 
sea-wall (U.S. DoD, 2018a). The airfield is essential for transporting people and 
equipment from the base. These bases demonstrate the risk to the many other 
coastal bases which are susceptible to the increasingly frequent and damaging 
storms but also those inland. The resulting costs of repair, adaptation, and lost 
training hours are essential to assessing the change in risk.  
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2.3.3 Riverine Flooding 
Storms that penetrate inland can also have devastating effects. Heavy 
rainfall can contribute to riverine flooding, saturate training ground, or flood 
impermeable developed areas on bases. The DoD’s 2017 Sustainable Ranges 
Report to Congress identified “the erratic nature of atypical weather events” as a 
significant hazard to critical infrastructure and human lives (U.S. DoD, 2017). In 
March of 2019, much of the Northern Great Plains was inundated with extreme 
precipitation and flooding of the Missouri River. Offut Air Force Base, NE, home 
of the U.S. Strategic Command (whose mission includes nuclear operations, 
strategic deterrence, space operations and missile defense among others) was 
severely affected (U.S. Strategic Command, 2018). While the final ramifications 
and cost are not yet published, the Air Force is requesting almost $5 billion in 
supplemental funding to avoid degrading other mission requirements during the 
extensive recovery of Offut and Tyndall AFBs (U.S. Air Force, 2019). 
In the Mojave Desert of California, extreme precipitation caused significant 
damage at Ft. Irwin during a 2013 monsoon (U.S. DoD, 2018a). More than 160 
buildings were damaged. The flooding also damaged the electronic target and 
communication equipment in the training area which is the army’s primary 
validation site for armored units scheduled for deployment (U.S. DoD, 2018a). 
The impact of these events is reflected in unanticipated repair costs and delays 
in certifying military units as ready for deployment. 
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Costs of these severe events can also include injury or loss of human life. 
In June 2016 nine Soldiers were killed at Fort Hood, Texas when a severe storm 
caused high water levels to overflow the training road networks. Not expecting 
the water level to be unprecedentedly high, the tactical vehicle entered a flooded 
area and overturned (U.S. DoD, 2017). Since then, roadways have been marked 
with high-water indicators common to areas where this type of rain event is more 
common.  
2.3.4 Drought   
Drought was listed as the most common climate related impact to 
installations in the 2018 screening level report (SLVAS). Affecting 732 DoD sites 
worldwide, drought conditions can stress bases in several ways. Directly, 
droughts deplete soil moisture and can contribute to surface damage and soil 
erosion. Following long periods of drought, the effect of a heavy rain is 
compounded and can lead to flooding and increased runoff (Gonzales et al., 
2018). Drought also stresses infrastructure other than training and operational 
facilities. Drought conditions limit water availability to families and businesses in 
the area. (Gonzales et al., 2018). Second order impacts include damage to 
runways, limits to vehicle traffic in high dust areas, and increased risk of wildfire 
due to dry conditions (U.S. DoD, 2019). Each of these impacts degrades a sites 
ability to host readiness essential training.  
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2.3.4 Wildfire  
Climate change has increased the risk of wildfire in the American west. 
Coupled with changes in fire suppression programs, increased aridity leaves 
forested areas with more flammable material (Abatzoglou and Williams, 2016). 
Using CMIP5 data, one study calculates a 100% increase in the forest area 
burned due to climate change since 1984 across the western United States 
(2016). After fires have subsided or passed, denuded hillsides are susceptible to 
severe erosion and polluted air can increase respiratory hazards (Gonzales, et 
al., 2018). Another contributory factor is the lengthening of the warm season 
which allows pests to thrive for longer and kill more trees, adding flammable 
material. Combined with reduced frequency of controlled burns due to 
encroachment and higher burn risk days (when controlled fires can spread 
beyond the prescribed area), the increased fuel load contributes to additional 
fires (Clark et al., 2018). While these fires are most visible and vast on the west 
coast, they also impact the Southeast region of the United States which is home 
to a significant percentage of the army’s training bases (Clark et al., 2018; 
Weatherly and Rosenbaum, 2016). Fire risk to ground maneuver units can limit 
training time and munition use, thus reducing readiness or incurring additional 
costs and risks. 
Wildfire affects national security in several ways. It is a direct threat to 
critical infrastructure, causes economic loss through interrupted business and 
insurance loss, redirects military forces assigned to fight fires, and limits the 
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ability of military units to train with certain ammunition and ordinance during high 
risk times (Clark et al., 2018; U.S. DoD, 2018a). Military munitions are sources of 
ignition. A March 2018 training event started a fire in Colorado which spread over 
five square miles and destroyed three homes (U.S. DoD, 2019). That fire 
occurred after two months of moderate drought, according to the U.S. Drought 
Monitor. Military installations that use ground maneuver units and live 
ammunition implement fire hazard reduction practices. Commanders are required 
to remain aware of published fire risk and implement risk mitigation or alter 
training during extreme fire risk conditions (U.S. DoD, 2019). However, 
unexpected or uncontrollable ignition can result in the spread of fires that 
damage property and further delay training. 
2.3.5 Melting Permafrost  
Melting permafrost due to increased temperatures and more intensive 
land use threatens both infrastructure and training land. The Alaskan coast line is 
home to several radar sites which monitor air traffic and other threats in the Arctic 
and across the Behring Straight (GAO, 2014). Section 335 of the FY18 NDAA 
also note that melting permafrost is damaging these stations and supporting 
infrastructure. 
 The army maintains several bases in Alaska. Important arctic mechanized 
vehicles training ranges at Fort Greeley, AK are built on permafrost (U.S. DoD, 
2018a). Preserving this land or identifying new training areas which will not be 
degraded from melting permafrost are vital to continued training and readiness of 
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Arctic capable forces. This is particularly crucial as access to the Arctic by global 
great powers increases. 
2.4 Merging the Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Frameworks: 
In January 2019, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued their reply 
to the requirements of the 2018 NDAA, section 335. Upon its release, the report 
and the DoD were criticized for failing to answer the requirements posed in the 
mandate. As written, the DoD’s method of assessment is extremely vague, 
despite the availability of several frameworks designed for this purpose. This 
section will describe a site vulnerability assessment framework which is weighted 
by the impact of exposure on mission critical infrastructure. This infrastructure 
supports the readiness of the DoD in accomplishing key national security 
missions. It addresses the classification of mission assurance locations, the 
hazards analyzed, and the tools that could have been used to better meet the 
mandates of section 335 of the NDAA and future assessments.  
The overarching method for these assessments follows the iterative three-
tiered approach described earlier. Nested within this approach are existing 
frameworks for thorough analysis at the scope of each respective tier. The 
mission assurance process, screening surveys, and historical events of known 
damage are used in the first phase. Once high-priority installations are identified, 
a vulnerability assessment using the impact assessment model is used to 
determine impacts. Those impacts are assessed through the probability-severity 
risk matrix and overall impact on missions are identified. This provides the basis 
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for the final step which is implementation of specific adaptive measures to 
mitigate the severity of the climate exposure on vulnerable systems and increase 
resilience. 
2.4.1 Tier One  
The first step is the classification of mission assurance installations 
conducted in accordance DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.45 (2018). There are 
several inputs and steps to classify an installation in this manner. The scope and 
process are only briefly summarized here, save a few significant and relevant 
steps which are emphasized. To be considered, an installation must house a 
Task Critical Asset (TCA) which is an asset whose loss, incapacitation, or 
disruption will result in the failure of or critical disruption to a strategic mission 
(U.S. DoD, 2018c). These assets are similar in definition to Critical Infrastructure 
which is defined in the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA, 2001). 
This process begins with asset and mission owners identifying their most critical 
assets. The assessment of criticality is collated at each successively higher 
echelon through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. The final selection of these assets and the rationale is classified, and 
this analysis does not seek to identify those assets or installations. This 
framework does not recommend any changes to the existing mission assurance 
and critical infrastructure policies.  
Concurrently, a screening level assessment is conducted which surveys 
installation managers on observed climate hazards which could result in impacts 
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based on their local expertise and standardized hazard data. This is similar to the 
SLVAS process described earlier but requires a standardized method for data 
collection and assessment of past events to overcome the qualitative and 
anecdotal evidence used in that report. 
One method for identifying these metrics is the vulnerability scoping 
diagram formalized by Polsky et al. (2007) and adapted to military installation 
assessments by Moss et al. (2016). The adaptation is presented in Figure 7 
below, identifying the three major dimensions of vulnerability: sensitivity, adaptive 
capacity, and exposure (Polsky et al., 2007). The three levels represented by the 
concentric rings are the dimensions of vulnerability, components of each 
dimension, and the measures of observable characteristics of the components. 
The inner core and dimensions are unchanging, and the components remain the 
same for the DoD vulnerability assessment. The measures must be broad 
enough to be comparable across the different services and their specific mission 
sets but specific enough that reliable data can be collected and compared.  
This diagram and method can be used with existing coarse data as part of 
the screening assessment. For this to be effective, these measures must be 
universal and readily available. Data regarding elevation, infrastructure within a 
flood zone, and previous event damages can be used to create a baseline 
vulnerability which is supplemented by engineering weather data from air force’s 
14th Weather Squadron, regional climate projections, and projected budgets and 
mission sets which are subject to change (Moss et al., 2016). Introduction of 
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specific measures in tier one of the process can initiate collection processes for 
future tiers if the information is not already available. Site leadership and  
agencies must continue to collect and manage this data to inform future 
assessments. 
Figure 7:  Vulnerability Scoping Diagram adapted from Moss et al., 2016; original 
concept from Polsky et al., 2007. 
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Once a list of sites identified as potentially vulnerable to climate change is 
identified they can be ranked based on potential risk to mission assurance or 
significant monetary/human loss. This list is then the focus of the second-tier 
assessment. Tier two, described below, is an in-depth vulnerability assessment 
which uses a combination of the vulnerability scoping diagram, data driven 
exposure metrics, and the probability-severity risk matrix to determine if sites are 
vulnerable enough to warrant prioritized resources to implement adaptive 
measures or if action can be taken with existing site resources. 
SLVAS: An example of tier one screening – Beginning in 2013, DoD 
began the process of screening installations across the globe for climate related 
impacts. The assessments began with only ten sites, then increased to five-
hundred, before expanding to the entire property inventory in late 2014 (U.S. 
DoD, 2018a). This phased approach allowed for refinement to specific questions 
asked and metrics to be referenced (e.g. elevation data).  
The results indicated that more than half of DoD sites reported an impact 
from one of several climate related factors. The most common hazards were 
drought, wind, and non-storm surge flooding which each impacted more than 700 
sites. Storm surge flooding and wildfires were also widely reported as impacts 
(U.S. DoD, 2018a). When comparing the geographic distribution of sites with no 
impacts to those with multiple impacts, there is not a readily apparent spatial 
correlation. DoD has not released a full listing of sites and their impacts, so it is 
impossible to further analyze the spatial data without significant assumptions.  
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The most significant caveat to the SLVAS is that the results are largely 
qualitative in nature. The surveys were completed by hundreds of different users 
with varying backgrounds and understanding of climate effects and risks. This 
problem is inherent in the broad survey approach but can be mitigated by 
requiring the use of standardized metrics and providing universal training to 
respondents. The USACE implemented a tool which provided sector and regional 
specific highlights of the third NCA for an online screening tool they developed 
(USACE, 2018). The tool also allows users at installations to use standardized 
metrics and generate risk results from a weighted order weighted average index. 
Applying local expert knowledge, the users can also adjust weights and level of 
risk acceptance. The survey provides a good baseline and identifies broad areas 
of concern while a more quantitative and methodological vulnerability 
assessment is conducted in tier two. A clear second tier effort has not yet 
followed the SLVAS.  
2.4.2 Tier Two  
With the most vulnerable and most critical installations identified, the next 
step is aligning resources to conduct thorough vulnerability assessments of those 
locations. Each of the three dimensions should be assessed using standardized 
measures. At this stage, measures are influenced by local stakeholders and 
personnel with enduring experience at the sites in question. However, external 
party facilitation is critical in maintaining comparable measures across all related 
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sites. Identifying a final risk level based on the impact of the measures will also 
help create a comparable list of at-risk sites. 
Vulnerability as a function of sensitivity and adaptive capacity and is 
difficult to operationalize. It is much more subjective in nature than current and 
projected exposure. Sensitivity can be classified by previous damages, condition 
and age of the assets, and geographic considerations like elevation. As previous 
studies have identified, coordination with the local community, personnel and 
equipment preparedness, economic capacity, and leadership all influence the 
adaptive capacity of an installation (Moss et al., 2014). Based on the rotational 
nature of military leadership (changing about every 24 months), enduring 
knowledge and organizational memory varies or is vested in local civilian 
leadership. If not coordinated well, this changeover can result in lost knowledge 
and a lower adaptive capacity. 
The location specific differences in sites also pose a challenge to 
department level administrators. Each site will face different hazards based on 
region and specific local conditions including elevation, size, and land use. 
Simultaneously, regional level analysis of climate related hazards can be 
conducted using the best available scientific data to determine exposure. 
Exposure, the frequency and intensity of climate related hazards occurring at or 
near a military installation can be conducted quantitatively using one or multiple 
metrics. 
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In addition to comprehensive site assessments, mission assurance assets 
also undergo a vulnerability assessment which includes non-climate hazards. 
The baseline assessment for determining the vulnerability of an asset is the all-
hazards threat assessment (AHTA) described in DoDI 6055.17 (2018). This 
assessment reviews a list of possible hazards and threats based on a probability-
severity matrix as described in the risk assessment framework. The federal 
government generally describes hazards as any condition that introduces the 
potential for damage, loss, or destruction of people or property, or degrades a 
mission. Hazards can be human or naturally caused. A threat is a hazard 
furthered by an actor with a hostile intent. As described above, the risk 
assessment framework evaluates risks from both environmental hazards and 
threats. 
The AHTA includes the evaluation of all threats and hazards to an 
installation and associated assets, not just climate change related ones. The list 
of hazards includes meteorological hazards and specifically “impacts of climate 
change” (U.S. DoD, 2018c, 39). This is a first step in identifying mission related 
metrics to determine the sensitivity, adaptive capacity, and pertinent exposures 
that will have the greatest impact on the mission. As installations complete this 
mandated all-hazard review, they can update and integrate their understanding 
of climate risks into ongoing assessments and adaptation plans. 
A mission assurance installation identified in the first step with a 
vulnerability and exposure impact that critical asset or its support systems, that 
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site should receive priority attention and resources. Locations with critical assets 
may be weighted more heavily than those without them. Sites without these 
assets, even if more susceptible to climate driven hazards, may not have an 
equal level of risk according to the risk framework. If a mission assurance site 
has a lower likelihood of experiencing a climate hazard but the severity of the 
damage in that rare instance is catastrophic, the risk may outweigh the frequent 
exposure of a less critical site. Prioritized next are all other installations which 
have an exposure-vulnerability impact that would classify as a medium, high, or 
extremely high risk. Depending on resources available, these installations should 
also be further evaluated for centrally sponsored adaptive measures. Units and 
installations can begin implementing available adaptations or increase adaptive 
capacity immediately while planning for tier three actions.  
2.4.3 Tier Three 
Tier one identified a broad range of installations which might be at 
elevated climate risk and tier two further assessed and prioritized systems within 
installations based on risk. Tier three activities include in-depth, system specific 
solutions to vulnerabilities. This stage requires extensive contextual knowledge 
from local stakeholders and technical experts to implement cost effective 
adaptations into project design and siting decisions. General adaptation 
strategies can be designed and required or suggested through DoD issued 
planning guidelines, but existing vulnerabilities may require retrofitting 
improvements onto existing infrastructure (Moss et al., 2016). The adaptations 
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will vary based on the location and nature of the associated hazard. Using a 
benefit-cost assessment, adaptations that prove too costly or ineffective can be 
foregone and the DoD may consider relocation of the critical assets. 
Another type of adaptation may require coordination with non-military local 
stakeholders. State, local, and private institutions located around the installation 
likely face similar issues and spillover effects from hazards can impact both sides 
of the fence. Installations are intricately integrated into the counties where they 
are located. Military and civilian employees and families live, attend school, 
receive essential services from, and work in the surrounding community. The 
economy of neighboring communities is often extensively linked to the existence 
of a military base. Displacement of military units based on asset vulnerabilities 
can have a significant impact on the community. Job loss and base reuse 
planning can pose challenges for local communities (Cowan, 2012). A study of 
closed sites following the last round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
identified a more pronounced impact in rural areas (Cowan, 2012). The political 
consternation of this process has resulted in a moratorium of any recent BRAC 
actions despite DoD leadership identification of bases that are not deemed cost 
effective (U.S. DoD, 2016b). The repercussions of climate induced impacts on 
military sites may further motivate a new BRAC study.  
There are also impacts on military installations from surrounding 
communities. Encroachment is a term used to describe the limitations imposed 
on DoD training and testing areas by both internal and external influences (GAO, 
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2016). This includes civilian development, endangered species and critical 
habitats, noise constraints, and the effects of climate change (specifically 
degraded land area). Climate change can exacerbate many of the other 
influences as well. Species migration, renewable energy projects, and human 
migration and land development are all greatly influenced by changing climate 
conditions. The DoD often mitigates encroachment issues with Joint Land Use 
Studies (U.S. DoD, 2019). These studies inform negotiations to mitigate the 
impacts of DoD operations on local areas and vice versa.  
There are several technical and human responses to installation 
vulnerabilities. This final tier can use the above processes to identify and resolve 
critical vulnerabilities. While there are some existing regulations and planning 
documents such as the Naval Facilities (NAVFAC) Climate Change Installation 
Adaptation and Resilience Planning Handbook and USACE planning tools, 
further attention and resource allocation will be required to address future 
threats. The DoD response to congressional enquiries about installation 
vulnerability is a reasonable opportunity to communicate these needs. 
2.5 Evaluation of the Department of Defense Response to Climate 
Vulnerability 
This section will analyze the DoD response and attempt to clarify the 
methodology the department may have used and compare it to feasible 
alternatives. The report begins with an assertion of mission criticality of only 79 
installations which are deemed most important based on their operational roles. 
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Instead of using any form of the above analysis frameworks, they begin their 
assessment with the concept of mission criticality and then query each mission 
critical location about whether they currently have, or expect to have within 
twenty years, impacts from any of the five selected climate related stressors. 
There is no clear indication that the climate exposure, even if listed as having an 
impact, would influence the part of the installation which initially led to its 
inclusion on the priority list. The report includes some listed impacts on select 
installations but does not connect the vulnerability with mission impact (U.S. 
DoD, 2019). 
One significant shortfall is that it did not use previous screening survey 
responses to inform the analysis which should have provided a more in-depth 
assessment of vulnerability. The instructions issued by the coordinating office did 
not specify which metrics to use. Instead the military services were free to “select 
information sources they deemed relevant” (U.S. DoD, 2019, 4).  Why the AHTA 
and the information used to complete that assessment are not referenced in the 
DoD report is not clear and contributes to the disapproval by congress and the 
public.  The 79 installations listed in the DoD response to Congress should 
already have considered the risks which they were then again asked to evaluate 
specifically for the report. Whether these initial AHTA considerations were 
referenced is, again, not clear. The screening process used in this report 
essentially repeated, with less structured analysis and at a smaller scope, the 
SLVAS.  
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Of the bases listed, some, like the Pentagon and Naval Station Norfolk, 
are clearly mission assurance installations. Others, like Camp Roberts, CA (a 
National Guard training base) are less publicly known for their contributions. The 
list of installations includes no marine corps sites, despite previous studies and 
congressional testimony describing the risk to these bases. Ironically, Tyndall 
AFB is not on the list which was published after the devastation of Hurricane 
Michael and significant damage to the fleet of F-22 aircraft (Udvardy, 2019). The 
failure to provide a top ten list per service, a specified requirement, without 
explanation undermines the credibility of the report. 
 Section 335 specifically listed rising coastal water levels, increased 
flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost as hazards to 
be addressed but also asked to include “any other categories the Secretary 
determines necessary” (U.S. Congress, 2017). The response does not include 
any other hazards despite positive responses to a previous screening survey for 
factors including high temperatures and extreme winds (U.S. DoD, 2018a). The 
cause of the wind damage is not clarified but could include cyclones and extreme 
weather events as well as tornadoes. For locations in the continental interior that 
reported no negative impacts from the five specified hazards, it is possible that 
other hazards can have a significant impact on mission critical assets. 
 The absence of an assessment on the impacts of increasing temperatures 
is concerning. Unlike the other hazards, most of which are at least in part results 
of temperature increases, increased heat poses limited risk to infrastructure. 
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Heat alone can increase the number of cooling degree days resulting in higher 
energy costs or inflict damage to sensitive equipment (Moss et al., 2016; US 
DOE, 2015). From a facilities and investment standpoint, it lacks the dramatic 
visible effects of floods and fires. However, for the dismounted service member, 
air crews, and other outdoor personnel, increased heat presents a consistent and 
readily apparent impact (Weatherly and Rosenbaum, 2016). The impact can 
significantly impede the ability of combat units to prepare for their assigned 
missions. This oversight is explored in detail in the following chapter.   
2.6 Conclusion 
Over the last several decades vulnerability and related human-
environment response concepts have evolved to include response to global 
environmental and climate related change. The DoD and other federal agencies 
are interested in understanding the implications of climate change related 
vulnerabilities to their mission. This chapter summarized key definitions and 
frameworks as they were developed or adapted for use in the national security 
context. Joining these frameworks with existing risk analysis processes facilitates 
the understanding of climate hazards as a formal risk that must be understood 
and managed. These risks, categorized by likelihood and severity, impact the 
mission and readiness of military installations and their tenant units.  
The effects of climate change as observed and projected in the vastly 
different regions and states of the world may contribute to both probability and 
severity of associated hazards. A standardized assessment is required to 
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compare installations across these regions and align resources for adaptation 
appropriately. The mechanism for the change is complex as there are countless 
factors which contribute or mitigate the exposure, vulnerability, or resilience of 
those that may be affected. It is also essential to understand the interconnected 
nature of these installations and the cascading and cumulative effects of multiple 
simultaneous hazard events.  
The next chapter examines one hazard that increases the risk to 
personnel and mission. By examining heat stress at military installations, an 
additional metric for assessing the impact of climate change on mission 
readiness and the generating force can be identified and implemented. 
Understanding both heat stress and large-scale hazard events that threaten the 
land on which these service members train creates a more wholistic picture of 
climate risk to the domestic national security mission. 
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CHAPTER THREE: HEAT STRESS IMPACTS ON TRAINING READINESS 
3.1 Background 
DoD’s recent vulnerability assessments have largely applied to 
infrastructure. However, some of the more prevalent risks involve the safety and 
readiness of servicemembers as they train for and execute their assigned 
missions. One of the hazards identified in the previous chapter involved 
significant flooding in training areas which resulted, in one case, in the deaths of 
several soldiers. Another hazard not directly addressed by the DoD report, but 
inherent in several of the ones that were, is increasing temperatures. Increases 
in average and extreme temperatures contribute to drought, wildfire, and thawing 
permafrost (Gonzales, et al., 2018). Extreme heat and humidity, together with 
intensive training and operating with restrictive clothing and heavy gear, can 
increase the incidence of heat injuries and illness (Hunt et al., 2016). An increase 
in the number of hot days will increase the exposure of servicemembers to these 
risks. 
The number of degraded training days can be used to quantify the impact 
of climate change on readiness. Severe heat stress potential is represented by 
“black flag” days, or days when the wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) exceeds 
90° F (32° C) (HQDA, 2003). The WBGT is useful in considering the true feel of 
the temperature by also including humidity, wind speed, and solar radiation in 
direct sunlight as these are the conditions a working service member will face. As 
the temperature reaches the progressively higher heat categories, or “flag” 
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levels, additional restrictions to training are enforced in accordance with various 
regulations (ARs), technical bulletins (TBs) and other local policies (HQDA, 2003; 
HQDA, 2017). Operating in these high temperature conditions increases the 
likelihood of hot weather illness and requires additional planning, training, and 
logistical support such as having coolers of ice water or medical personnel on 
hand. Training at higher intensities during hotter time frames requires a 
significant rest to work ratio. The additional rest time requirements can reduce 
time available for service members to perform training tasks, especially when 
wearing standard combat equipment (HQDA, 2003).  
Recent DoD vulnerability assessments have not quantified risk to 
readiness based on heat as a hazard (U.S. DoD, 2019). Changes in temperature, 
however, are among the most certain projections available and can be applied to 
training bases to determine the impact increasing heat stress will have on 
training (Hayhoe et al., 2018). Live field training in a variety of environments is 
essential to the readiness of combat forces. There are specific outdoor live fire 
training tasks that individual service-members and collective units must 
accomplish to be considered fully trained (HQDA, 2017). Decreases in the 
number of available training days due to heat threatens the overall readiness of 
the armed forces. 
This chapter will analyze increased heat stress. It seeks to answer how 
heat stress, represented by WBGT, changed across important ground training 
locations in the past forty years and how it is projected to change in the future. 
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Using North American Land Data Assimilation System (NLDAS-2) Primary 
Forcing Data for the years 1979 to 2018, it identifies trends of existing impacts. 
Then, using climate projections from the Community Climate System Model 
(CCSM4) CMIP5 run, further heat stress indices are developed for the periods of 
2006 to 2015 and 2046 to 2055. This data is useful in understanding the future 
loss of available training days, particularly for the basic military training programs 
and army readiness training centers. A significant decrease in available training 
days may require the relocation of training units or a change in the annual 
distribution of training classes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
Previous work calculating historical and projected heat stress for the 
military is limited. The seminal work in calculating WBGT from weather data was 
conducted in 2008 for U.S. army munition storage and destruction depots 
(Liljegren et al., 2008). At these sites, civilian and military personnel must don 
protective equipment and work in outdoor conditions which escalates the risk of 
heat related injury or illness if the heat index is not monitored properly. Liljegren 
et al., working on behalf of Argonne National Laboratories, used a novel physics-
based approach to refine weather based WBGT calculations. Prior to this study, 
sites relied only on physical monitoring systems or equations that required site 
specific coefficients (2008). Since their study, this model has been incorporated 
into the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) technical manual 
for monitoring heat stress. 
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Two reports commissioned by the DoD consider heat index and WBGT 
projections related to military vulnerability. The first was part of a SERDP 
research project examining a much larger scope of climate related vulnerabilities 
and has been referenced extensively in this work (Moss et al., 2016). The 
research team focused on three east coast military sites: The United States 
Naval Academy (USNA), Fort Bragg, NC, and Joint Base Langley-Eustis (JBLE), 
VA. They used the NARCCAP Ensemble with a 1971-2000 reference and 
projected through 2070. The WBGT and flag days were estimated from the 
global summary of the day (GSOD) station observations using temperature, 
humidity, and surface pressure available from NOAA (Moss et al., 2016).  
They identified no significant trend in historical data or projections of 
increased WBGT at USNA or JBLE but three to seventeen additional black flag 
days annually at Ft. Bragg and other locations in the South East (Moss et al., 
2016). Model differences in air temperature, radiation, wind speed, and humidity 
result in significant uncertainty for the changes in the number of flag days for the 
models. However, most of the changes in WBGT are driven by changes in 
temperature.  
A second research project was conducted over the same time frame. 
Weatherly and Rosenbaum, working in coordination with SERDP, used 
downscaled GCM projections and historical predictions to determine future 
incidence of high heat index days. This model expanded the study area of the 
Moss et al., research to the majority of the North American continent (Weatherly 
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and Rosenbaum, 2016). Future projections were based on the CMIP5 
representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 scenario. They calculated daily 
maximum and minimum WBGT. The total number of days in which the max daily 
WBGT reached the threshold for any heat category was collected. The number of 
days where the minimum WBGT was above the minimum threshold for heat 
category one, or white flag (25.6° C) was also recorded (Weatherly and 
Rosenbaum, 2016).  
Wet bulb temperature was calculated using the maximum and minimum 
daily ambient temperature and relative humidity (derived from dewpoint) against 
a skew-T diagram. Black-globe temperature is calculated using an algorithm 
derived form a quadratic equation posited by Dimiceli et al. (2011, in Weatherly 
and Rosenbaum, 2016). Given realistic parameters, the model can be 
approximated linearly using only variables collected regularly by the National 
Weather Service. One variable in this equation not provided by the models used 
by Weatherly and Rosenbaum was maximum solar irradiance. They obtained 
these values using the monthly mean of the maximum daily irradiance for the 
nearest physical monitoring station. 
Based on their RCP 8.5 models, they predict an increase in number of 
heat category five days across the U.S by the end of the 21st century. The largest 
change is seen in the Southeast (75 more days) and southern Great Plains (55 
more days), and the least change will occur in the U.S. Northwest (18 more days) 
(Weatherly and Rosenbaum, 2016). The increase in days expected in the 
71 
 
Southwest will contribute to already frequent heat category days and the region 
could experience more than 200 days a year when the index reaches category 
five (black flag) for at least part of the day. Another significant impact is the 
increase in days where the minimum WBGT is above heat category one (white 
flag) temperatures. Much of the Southeast and Southwest will be subject to 30-
80 days a year when intense training will have work time constraints regardless 
of the hour of day (Weatherly and Rosenbaum, 2016). When the minimum 
WBGT never falls below a restrictive condition, shifts in training timelines can 
only partially alleviate limits on training. 
3.3 Site descriptions 
More than 70,000 new army recruits and 37,500 marines began basic 
training in FY2017 (Military Personnel Posture, 2017). Many of these recruits 
conduct basic training during the summer months following high school 
graduations and almost all of them conduct training in the continental Southeast. 
In addition to army and marine basic military training, new airman conduct 
training in Texas. Cadets and midshipman from the service academies conduct 
training in New York, Maryland, and Colorado during the summer months 
between academic semesters. These new servicemembers are generally young 
and of varying levels of physical fitness. This age group has the highest 
incidence of heat related injuries, more than six in one thousand, according to the 
Defense Health Agency (2018). As average and extreme temperatures rise 
around these training locations, the risk of occurrence also increases. 
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The army conducts basic training at four major installations, Fort Benning, 
GA, Fort Sill, OK, Fort Leonard-Wood, MO, and Fort Jackson, SC. Marine corps 
basic training occurs at Parris Island, SC and San Diego, CA (and nearby Camp 
Pendleton). Air Force training is conducted near San Antonio, TX. Depending on 
the service and specific military occupational specialty of a recruit, training varies 
from ten to twenty-two weeks in length. The military also has four service 
academies supporting the army, navy, air force, and coast guard. Like most basic 
training recruits, officer candidates at the service academies are usually recent 
high school graduates and complete summer training prior to entering their first 
and second academic years. 
Figure 8 displays ten selected training locations. Two of these sites (Ft. 
Polk, LA and Ft. Irwin, CA) are pre-deployment readiness sites for the Army but 
maintain similar missions of high intensity year-round training. Other than navy 
boot camp (not assessed here) and Camp Pendleton, CA, all major initial 
enlisted training sites are located in regions with hot climates with annual 
average summer temperatures between 89 and 97°F. The three military 
academies experience more moderate weather with average maximum summer 
temperatures around 80°F. 
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Table 3: Military Initial Training Sites and geographic regions as classified by NCA4. 
Service Base Region 
Air Force Lackland AFB, TX Southern Great Plains 
Air Force Air Force Academy, CO Southwest 
Marine Corps Camp Pendleton, CA Southwest 
Marine Corps 
Army 
MCRD Parris Island, SC 
Fort Irwin, CA 
Southeast 
Southwest 
Army Fort Benning, GA Southeast 
Army Fort Jackson, SC Southeast 
Army Fort Polk, LA Southeast 
Army West Point, NY Northeast 
Navy Annapolis, MD Northeast 
`
Figure 8: Geographic location of Military Initial Training Sites. Temperatures listed are 
average annual temperature for  2016, in °C. 
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3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) Calculation 
WBGT is traditionally measured with instruments at training sites. Annual 
guidance from the Army Surgeon General requires the use and monitoring of 
stationary measuring devices during summer months at training sites (HQDA, 
2017). However, the record of this information is not maintained in a manner to 
support decision making, if at all (Moss et al., 2016). Additionally, due to the 
potential for miscalibration and the reactionary nature of these devices, the 
services and other organizations have applied models with local weather data to 
predict and measure representative WBGT (OSHA, 2017). These models include 
ambient air temperature, shortwave radiation, wind speed, and relative humidity 
(Liljegren et al., 2008).   
Except for relative humidity, each of these variables are obtained from 
NLDAS-2 Primary Forcing Data. NLDAS data is from the NASA Goddard Earth 
Sciences Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC) data rod database 
(Teng et al., 2016). Historical hourly data for each variable for each site listed in 
Table 3 was queried and reported for 1979 through 2018. This data could then 
be used to calculate the three components of WBGT as seen in equation 1: 
WBGT = 0.7Tw + 0.2Tg + 0.1Ta (1) 
where Tw: wet bulb temperature, Tg: globe temperature, Ta: dry bulb (ambient) 
temperature. 
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Several intermediate steps are required to transform the hourly data into 
wet bulb temperature and globe temperature. These temperature variables can 
be calculated using formulas based on the physical properties of heat and mass 
transfer and derived by Liljegren et al. (2008). The ambient temperature, Ta, is 
used in its reported form and requires no transformation. The equations for 
calculating wet bulb temperature, Tw, and globe temperature, Tg, are derived and 
fully explained in the referenced paper; a discussion of their derivation is highly 
technical and not included here. Liljegren et al.’s results were tested using 
calibrated on-site stations and proved robust with errors less than 1° C when 
compared to the physical site measurement (Liljegren et al., 2008). 
Liljegren et al.’s model is replicated and available in the open statistical 
software R (Casanueva, 2017). It requires an input of ambient air temperature, 
shortwave radiation, wind speed, latitude, longitude, and dew point. Dew point is 
not available from the NLDAS-2 data but can be calculated from specific 
humidity, ambient temperature, and air pressure. A two-step calculation was 
required to determine this value for the observed and projected days (Bolton, 
1980). The first step in this process is calculating relative humidity (RH) using air 
temperature, vapor pressure and saturation vapor pressure, and constants for air 
pressure. The second step is calculating the dew point which is the temperature 
at which the air is completely saturated. 
Dew point, along with the other raw data values can then be passed to the 
WBGT calculation function. Once the hourly WBGT is calculated for the selected 
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sites using equation 1, the data can be used to classify each hour into a heat 
category. Table 4 shows the heat categories, associated temperature thresholds, 
and required work-rest ratios. The data can be aggregated at different temporal 
scales. For this assessment, the average WBGT, daily maximum and minimum 
Ta, and resultant heat category are calculated for monthly and annual analysis.  
Table 4: Categorization of Heat Categories by temperature and associated limitations. 
 3.4.2 “Flag Days” versus “Flag Hours” 
The impact of heat stress can be interpreted at different temporal scales. 
One method is to classify a day in accordance with the highest category 
experienced. If the WBGT exceeded a category threshold, even for one hour, 
that day is classified at that maximum category. For example, a day in which the 
WBGT reaches but never exceeds 32 °C, is classified as a red flag day, even if 
that condition was met for only one hour. This method may lead to an over 
estimate of time lost due to heat stress. To account for this, the majority of this 
Heat cat. 
(Flag color) 
WBGT 
°C (°F) 
Easy 
work/rest 
Moderate 
work/rest 
Hard 
work/rest 
1 (white) 25.6–27.6 (78–81.9) — — 40/20 min 
2 (green) 27.7–29.3  (82–84.9) — 50/10 min 30/30 min 
3 (yellow) 29.4–31.0  (85–87.9) — 40/20 min 30/30 min 
4 (red) 31.1–32.1 (88–89.9) — 30/30 min 20/40 min 
5 (black) 32.2 (90) 50/10 min 20/40 min 10/50 min 
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analysis focuses on heat category five, or black flag days, when even one hour at 
that temperature can lead to significant disruption and because the temperature 
inevitably passes through the other four categories for varying amounts of time. 
The modeled impact also provides the number of hours per day a 
condition exists. This fine grain hourly data can also be summed monthly or 
annually to assess the number of hours during each period that training is 
affected. Training schedules, especially for basic training missions, are rigidly 
scheduled to the hour. This measurement, absent in other literature, provides 
greater detail on the true effects to commanders in the field. One caveat is that 
interpretation of total hours per year is difficult to interpret on an annual scale.  
3.4.3 Identify Trends in Observed Data: 
An analysis of the historical data provides information about site specific 
averages in temperature and whether, with the moderate amount of warming 
already occurring, there has been a change in the distribution of heat category 
occurrence. Figure 10 shows the distribution of black flag days at the various 
sites. Non-coastal bases in the Southeast and Southwest have a significantly 
higher amount of black flag days than others.  
The average number of days per year when the maximum temperature 
reached a heat category can be used to compare the heat stress faced by 
trainees at different sites. It also provides a simple and comparable value for 
historical and projected averages. Figure 11 depicts the average days per year 
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each base experienced a heat category as a result of the maximum daily 
temperature. Again, the Southeast and Southwest show not only more black flag 
days, but that black flag days occur more frequently than lesser flag condition 
days. 
Figure 9: Mean and variance of Black Flag Day frequency at select sites. 
79 
Figure 10: C
um
ulative average num
ber of days each base experienced a m
axim
um
 of any heat category requiring w
ork 
rest ratio m
itigation 
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The previous two graphics demonstrate that these training bases already 
have significant periods of time where black flag conditions can limit training. 
However, to identify if the amount of time lost to heat-stress imposed limitations 
is increasing, the data must be compared over time. The below (Figure 10) 
shows the amount of black flag days (max WBGT greater than 90°F) and no flag 
days (max WBGT less than 78°F) at Fort Benning, GA from 1979 to 2018. Fort 
Benning is the home of the army’s infantry and armor schools where troops 
conduct extensive field training. During the first twenty years of data, there were 
no years in which the amount of black flag days (solid black line) was greater 
than no flag days (dashed black line). During five of the last ten years of data, the 
amount of black flag days was greater than or equal to the number of no flag 
days. The trend in the data for this time period at Fort Benning shows a clear 
change in the proportion of days with disrupted training. 
Figure 11: The number of black flag days is increasing while the number of safe training 
days per year is decreasing. For the last ten years of data, the frequency of each is about 
equal. 
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Similar trends appear in the other training locations as well. Camp 
Pendleton and the three service academies exhibit a steady trend of few to no 
black flag days and a slight decrease in the number of safe training days. 
Lackland AFB also does not demonstrate a change in the proportion of black to 
no flag days, but the quantity of black flag days is the far more frequent 
occurrence (about 200 black flag days per year to 85 safe days). This trend is 
expected to continue into the future as ambient temperatures rise. 
3.4.4 Approximating heat risk time with ambient temperature forecasts: 
Projections of daily high and low temperature are available from NASA 
NEX GDDP dataset of the CCSM4's CMIP5 run under the RCP8.5 scenario. This 
data is bias corrected and downscaled to a 2.5° x 2.5° resolution. For this 
assessment, I used a reference period of 2006 to 2015 and a future period of 
2046 to 2055. These two periods, forty years apart, allow for a clear comparison 
of a change in climate but are near enough that decision makers can use the 
assessments in long term base planning. 
There are three methods, each with their own limitations, to predicting the 
future impact of heat stress on training time. The availability of time-coincident 
observed site data and modeled hindcasts allows for a comparison of the 
downscaled projections to actual measurements. Because of the potential for 
uncorrected biases in the projections, the differences in the observed and 
historically projected temperatures and resulting heat index conditions are 
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noticeable. The first method for addressing this issue is to consider the percent 
change in temperature from the reference period to the future which can then be 
applied to the observed data for the reference years 2006 to 2015. The new 
predictions based on the observed data and expected percent change yield a 
bias-corrected prediction of future temperatures for the selected sites.  
Method One: Adjusted temperature function derived WBGT 
The adjusted maximum future temperature data can be combined with 
site-specific constant variables for wind, radiation, and humidity to calculate 
WBGT using the function described above. For this method, the mean wind 
velocity by day of year and the maximum humidity and solar radiation by day of 
year are used. Each variable is calculated by day of year and base to account for 
seasonal and location differences. Solar radiation and humidity maximums are 
used because the daily max WBGT usually coincides, within a few hours, of the 
max of each of these variables. The sensitivity to using other measures of these 
variables is explored in Weatherly and Rosenbaum with a less than 0.5 °C 
impact on maximum WBGT (2016).  
Method Two: Adjusted temperature modeled WBGT 
The repeated calculation of the WBGT and the required intermediate 
steps is time and data intensive. To reduce the need for calculating multiple 
relatively-stable variables, WBGT can be modeled in a second method. The 
relationship between the maximum and minimum daily temperature and the 
resultant maximum WBGT can be described in a generalized additive model 
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(GAM). An analysis of the temperature, dew point, radiation, and wind patterns 
show heterogeneity across time and locations. Therefore, a separate model is 
constructed for each base. Equation 2 below is the reduced form version of this 
model.   
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝑓𝑓�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 where 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 ∼  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) where  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is the max WBGT for each day at the selected site, 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the max daily temperature ℃ 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is the min daily temperature ℃ 
The results of method one and method two indicate no significant 
difference between the two sets of calculated WBGTs.  
Method Three: Flag hours adjusted after model prediction 
The final method involves using the raw CCSM4 maximum and minimum 
temperatures to calculate the number of flag hours by heat category for each day 
of both periods (HIST: 2006–2015; FUT: 2046–2055). Like Method Two, this 
approach uses a GAM in the form of equation one, but instead uses hours per 
day at each flag condition as the dependent variable. For this method, a separate 
model is constructed for each base and for each flag condition resulting in a total 
of 60 models. Each of these models is then used to predict the number of hours 
at each flag condition for the HIST and FUT data.  
The discrepancy in the observed data compared to the HIST data is 
considered last. Because the functions are non-linear, averaging the changes 
beforehand will significantly reduce the impact of the changes in the upper and 
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lower tails of the distribution of changes. Thus, to preserve as much information 
contained in the climate model as possible, the averaging and calculation of 
percent change is conducted last before applying that change to the observed 
data. For bases like Camp Pendleton near San Diego, CA where there were no 
days above white flag condition, the raw increase in days between HIST and 
FUT was added to the observed amount. The model cannot predict the change in 
high flag conditions because there were no observations with those conditions in 
the original data. When compared to the results calculated through the other two 
methods, the expected days per year at each flag condition are generally similar. 
The average difference between model three and models one and two is seven 
days for black flag days and nineteen days for safe/no flag days. A full 
comparison is presented in Appendix 1.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Heat Days  
This section presents the predicted trends and changes in the number of 
flag days at each site. The observed and historical data cover the period of 2006 
to 2015 and the future data describe the mid-century period of 2046 to 2055. The 
results described here were obtained using method three, though a comparison 
of the different results is available in the appendix. The frequency of days limited 
by WBGT and the change between periods is presented in table 5.  In general, 
all bases are predicted to lose safe training days which is when the WBGT does 
not impact available training time. All bases will experience an increase in the 
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number of black flag days and that increase is larger than the increase in any 
other category. On average, each base is expected to lose between two and four 
weeks of uninterrupted training time over the course of the year. 
The increase in black flag days is most significant in the locations which 
already experience a significant number of days at this highest category. Forts 
Irwin and Polk and Lackland AFB will see 23, 23, and 28 additional black flag 
days respectively. Fort Irwin and Fort Polk will reach about 180 days per year 
with black flag conditions. These two pre-deployment training certification sites 
will have training restricted for half the year. Lackland AFB, home of Air Force 
Basic Training, will experience black flag conditions for roughly two-thirds of the 
year and have less than two months when training is not impacted by any flag 
condition. The basic military training sites in the Southeast (Ft. Benning, Ft. 
Jackson, and MCRD Parris Island) will continue to experience extreme WBGTs 
for four to five months of the year.  
Most of the loss of uninterrupted no-flag days is reflected in the increase in 
black flag days while the intermediate categories exhibit little overall change at all 
bases. This is likely because the middle categories are bounded by a maximum 
and minimum temperature and most bases already have days that meet and 
exceed those conditions. As days further into spring and fall get warmer, the 
days in the moderate flag categories will shift away from the summer and days 
that were previously in these categories will likely reach black flag conditions.  
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Camp Pendleton near San Diego, CA is expected to see only a moderate 
increase of two days in white flag conditions and no change from zero days in the 
more restrictive categories. In the other two prediction methods there is also no 
change in the severe categories, but the base may see up to 20 days at white 
flag conditions. The conditions there are strongly tempered by the coastal 
climate. 
Lastly, when using methods one and two, the service academies 
experience a significant percent increase in extreme heat category days. This is 
likely due to the small initial amount of black flag days in the observed period. 
The increases are concentrated in the summer months, when the cadets and 
midshipman conduct almost all of their military training. 
3.5.2 Heat Hours  
The change in the number of hours available for training is a useful metric 
for commanders. Due to the high tempo of operations, commanders may need to 
train during days when the temperature reaches black flag conditions. If service-
members are able to conduct minimal work during the hours experiencing 
extreme conditions, the remaining hours of the day can still be used for intense 
training. The below figures depict the number of hours projected to be impacted 
by the various flag conditions at mid-century (predicted) compared to the number 
of hours impacted during the reference period (observed).  
Most of the extreme heat category hours can be expected to fall during the 
late afternoon and early evening, when ambient temperature is highest. In the 
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severely affected areas, namely Lackland AF and Fort Irwin, there have already 
been full days (more than 24 continuous hours) of black flag conditions. 
Southeast bases, Ft. Benning, Ft. Jackson, Ft. Polk, and MCRD Parris Island 
experience about 14 hours of black flag conditions during the hottest summer 
months in the observed record. 
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Figure 12: Flag hours per year. The loss of hours is a valuable metric for commanders 
to determine overall lost man-hours of training. 
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Table 5: The observed (2006-2015) and future (2046-2055) average number of flag days by 
category for ten military training sites. Future projections are scaled from RCP 8.5 
scenario with bias reduced using projected percent change imposed on observed data. 
Category OBS RCP 8.5 Change OBS RCP 8.5 Change  
Benning Pendleton 
Black 133 146 13 0 0 0 
Red 15 15 0 0 0 0 
Yellow 25 25 0 0 0 0 
Green 21 22 1 0 0 0 
White 27 25 -2 10 12 2 
--- 145 108 -37 355 283 -72       
Irwin Polk 
Black 157 179 23 154 182 28 
Red 10 14 4 15 11 -4
Yellow 17 18 1 29 31 2
Green 17 16 -1 25 30 5
White 25 22 -3 28 26 -2
--- 140 112 -28 114 79 -35       
Jackson USAFA 
Black 116 132 16 26 41 15 
Red 16 15 -1 16 11 -5
Yellow 23 20 -3 25 20 -5
Green 19 25 6 24 30 6
White 24 24 1 26 30 5
--- 167 131 -36 248 224 -24       
Lackland USMA 
Black 207 235 28 13 17 4
Red 17 13 -4 10 13 3
Yellow 23 21 -2 22 17 -5
Green 19 22 3 26 23 -3
White 22 19 -3 31 26 -5
--- 77 50 -27 262 245 -17       
Parris USNA 
Black 117 132 15 23 28 6
Red 21 20 -1 13 9 -4
Yellow 32 29 -3 28 27 -1
Green 26 31 5 32 30 -2
White 35 28 -7 29 26 -3
--- 135 106 -29 242 221 -21
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3.6 Discussion: 
The increase in heat index across these training sites will affect the 
training of military personnel. Training, which is the corner stone of readiness, 
must continue adapt just as the missions of the U.S. military have over time. The 
increased risk of heat injury will limit the time available, especially during the day 
in summer months, for troops to train outdoors. Increased risk of heat illness may 
necessitate increased medical personnel on standby and more frequent and 
intense training for leaders to identify and prevent these casualties. These 
conditions may help servicemembers acclimatize to extreme temperatures faced 
in deployed locations if they depart during or shortly after the summer (Hanna 
and Tait, 2015). Overall, the increased risk of heat illness and the costs of 
mitigating the risk will outweigh potential benefits. 
Long periods of extreme heat may necessitate a shift to additional indoor 
training when feasible. Indoor marksmanship ranges exist in some bases like 
Fort Drum, NY, where weather limits range use for several months a year. Fort 
Drum is a cold weather training area, much more likely to face extreme cold days 
than extreme heat. However, indoor ranges like those at Fort Drum may need to 
be constructed in the Southeast, Southwest, and Southern Great Plains regions. 
These ranges, and the energy used to cool these and the many other buildings 
on bases, will be a costly adaptation. Additionally, service members can make 
increased use of virtual training centers for marksmanship practice, team, and 
vehicle-based training exercises. While these virtual events do not replace the 
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need for live fire training in many instances, they can increase the proficiency of 
troops at certain tasks to limit the amount of outdoor training required leading up 
to a certifying event. 
It is important to note that servicemembers have been and will continue to 
be called to operate around the world, including places where the heat index is 
above those described here. The ability to operate in these extreme climates is 
essential to supporting the DoD mission. Training in hotter than normal 
conditions can teach servicemembers awareness of signs and symptoms of heat 
illness and train leaders on how to prepare and respond to these events. 
Additionally, service members can acclimatize in the weeks leading up to a 
deployment by conducting exercise in hotter conditions (if available). This 
acclimatization, however, is still limited by physiological responses and is only 
temporary if not maintained (Hanna and Tait, 2015). A total of 359 heat related 
injuries or illnesses affected service members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan 
between 2013–2017 (AFHSB, 2018). This time frame is after the major surge in 
U.S. forces to the region and most ground forces were largely engaged in 
advising and assisting roles with less frequent combat than over the previous 
decade. If areas of conflict and instability continue to warm beyond a temperature 
in which deployed servicemembers can conduct moderate to significant 
workloads in full protective gear, enduring deployments to those locations may 
not be feasible for dismounted ground troops.  
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Acclimatization and training on warning indicators and risk reduction 
methods is important. However, these risk mitigating factors require additional 
time and resources. Current risk mitigation for heat exposure includes limits on 
training time, water consumption monitoring, increased leader and teammate 
observation, and physical cooling mechanisms. Some of these require no 
additional resources beyond increased awareness and training. However, 
physical cooling equipment such as ice sheets (bed sheets maintained in an ice 
water filled cooler), ice troughs, and misting fans or air-conditioned buildings 
require monetary investment and additional time to train on and prepare. If a 
leader believes the risk of a heat casualty to be significant, they may require a 
military medical evacuation vehicle staffed by medics at their site. This additional 
manpower requirement can compete with other requirements. Using the risk 
matrix and composite risk management worksheet described in chapter two, 
leaders at various levels can identify, mitigate, and assume risk.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The average temperature in the U.S. South is increasing. This increase 
contributes to the risk of heat illness in personnel training to ensure the readiness 
of the military. The risk of heat illness is greatest in young, non-acclimatized 
recruits in combat specialties (AFHSB, 2018). The training bases for this 
particular population is concentrated in areas of the country where high heat 
index levels occur nearly daily for more than 30% of the year. Mitigating this risk 
requires leaders to pace training, increase rest to work ratios, and monitor 
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servicemembers water intake and physical signs of heat stress. These risk 
control methods are essential but also reduce available outdoor training time. 
The previous thirty years of data has shown a reversal in the number of 
black flag and no flag training days at most training sites. Projections from 
climate models suggest that this trend will increase. For bases that already 
experience black flag days during most of the summer the impacts will spread to 
the spring and fall. For bases, like the military academies, that do not currently 
experience frequent extreme heat categories, the change is more dramatic 
during the critical summer months. These mid-century projections fall within the 
planning window of the DoD. The impacts of increased heat on training should be 
included in the overall vulnerability assessments conducted by the DoD.  
With a DoD focus on installation and asset level vulnerability, the 
responsibility to consider and mitigate heat risk falls to local leaders. If the DoD 
does not identify an increase in the number of heat related casualties as a 
significant risk compared to infrastructure and equipment damage from extreme 
events, this burden will continue to fall to these junior leaders. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
4.1 Summary 
The impacts of climate change on the national security of the United 
States are broad and significant. Changing global conditions impact the missions 
servicemembers must train for and the weather conditions they will operate in 
while also affecting the places they live and train. These changing conditions 
impact risk, the military’s method for assessing the probability and severity of the 
hazard-mission interface. New risk is introduced in the Arctic, small island states 
and coastal areas, and in the dry interior of the U.S. Southwest and African 
continent. The national security institutions, including the military, must continue 
to study the ongoing and projected affects of climate change and implement 
associated risk mitigation strategies into immediate and long-term planning. This 
project identified some important considerations for the U.S. homeland and the 
current National Security and Defense Strategies.  
The security ramifications of climate change affect more than just the U.S. 
military. While the U.S. is far more resilient than many other nations, the same 
technological advances that contribute to the resiliency have inherent 
vulnerabilities. Complex energy and transportation infrastructure connect even 
the most remote parts of the contiguous United States. Expansive and population 
dense cities line the coasts and generate wealth. However, disruptions in these 
systems from heat waves, extreme weather, and sea level rise related flooding 
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thus have further reaching impacts. Local events can have a national, and 
sometimes international, impact.  
International security concerns, as asserted in recent strategy documents, 
highlight the evolving competitive space. Conventional threats such as China and 
Russia are augmented by unconventional and emerging threats. Violent 
extremist organizations, the focus of U.S. combat power over the past nearly two 
decades, thrive in the disruption caused by climate shocks. Weak states, where 
these organizations operate, are breeding grounds for discontent related to 
resource availability. Powerful states can leverage the chaos to further their own 
resources and influence as seen in Syria and various Sub-Saharan states. These 
great power states, including China and Russia, also seek influence and 
resources in new arenas, namely the Arctic. As the ice melts, new routes and 
resources are increasingly available. Where cooperation and joint efforts have 
prevailed, new risks exist. To remain competitive, the United States must invest 
in the partnerships, technology, and training required for these changing 
missions. 
The force projection and training platforms where those advancements 
occur are also susceptible to climate change. The regions of the United States 
face challenges from fire and drought to flooding and coastal inundation. With a 
vast network of installations and sites, the DoD must have a comprehensive 
method for evaluating and addressing risk. Much of the risk reduction expertise 
and assessment must happen at the local level, but requires funding, resources, 
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and emphasis from national leadership. Beginning with a department wide 
survey, iterations of which have already occurred, the DoD can identify the bases 
with mission critical assets that are most at risk. This requires local knowledge 
and existing data. Once the installations are selected, a more in-depth 
vulnerability assessment can take place focused on local factors with clear 
measurable metrics and impacts. Vulnerabilities that can be resolved with 
physical or system-based solutions are addressed in the third stage of 
assessment. Fortifying structures, elevating piers, and increasing the energy 
resilience are examples of physical improvements already occurring at many 
installations. However, these can only mitigate a certain amount of risk for the 
service members who train and operate outdoors and require certification during 
rigid training timelines.  
One of the most significant climate related impacts not addressed by 
recent vulnerability assessments is the increase in extreme heat occurrence. 
Measured by the wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT), the occurrence of high 
heat index days is increasing in the training installation dense regions of the U.S. 
Southeast and Southwest. As the frequency and severity of high heat index days 
increase, the unrestricted training time for basic trainees and combat troops 
decreases. Risk mitigation costs time and money for small units with large 
training requirements. Increased rest to work ratio and medical support are 
required to keep these servicemembers safe without sacrificing readiness.  
97 
These risks are just a few that the national security community faces. 
They focus on the broad interests of the United States, and the specific impacts 
on members of the military. These service members must continue to train where 
the resources are available, largely in the hottest parts of the country. These 
training installations are ageing and susceptible to damage from increasingly 
frequent and severe climate events. The military must assess and provide 
funding to increase the resiliency of these locations for the sake of the members 
and the greater security mission. That mission grows in scope as the climate 
changes and new theaters emerge. Managing this requires a science based 
strategic policy involving the whole of government, not just military response.  
4.2 Areas for Further Study 
Conflict and natural disaster events occurring in nations around the world 
do not necessitate United States involvement, particularly with armed forces, but 
increasingly dangerous environments and changing resource availability may 
increase that likelihood. The military is trained to operate in these events and a 
study of where and what factors contribute most to scenarios which include 
deployment can inform analysts and decision makers. A growing literature of 
fragile states and changing climate variables already exists (Goodman et al., 
2007; Hsiang et al., 2013; Theisen et al, 2011; Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014; 
Raleigh et al., 2015). These correlations between climate variables, namely 
temperature and precipitation changes, and conflict, migration, and state failure 
can inform the mission requirements of the DoD.  
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Identification of critical assets is largely dependent on current and 
expected mission sets and the overall defense security strategy. Climate change 
has been identified as a threat multiplier which can exacerbate already 
dangerous conditions (Goodman et al., 2007). For instance, if increased extreme 
events are expected to lead to more frequent humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR), the capabilities to project personnel and equipment to 
these vulnerable areas may become critical capabilities. In this context, climate 
change can influence the greater national security mission which in turn affects 
which installations must be assessed for vulnerability to climate change.  
Drastic changes in regional climate may also affect the conditions in which 
the military may be expected to operate. Increased access to the Arctic may shift 
the location of military assets and installations where equipment and personnel 
will have to adapt to relatively colder local climates. Areas which face increased 
desertification and heat may also be areas ripe for conflict as local farmers and 
herders compete for limited resources. The military must adapt capabilities to 
operate in these austere conditions. Consideration of climate change exposures 
permeate all levels of the risk assessment framework and are vital to shaping 
and preserving the national security strategy.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 6: Comparison of three methods for calculating future flag days. 
Method OBS 1 2 3 OBS 1 2 3  
Benning Pendleton 
Black 133 148 149 146 0 0 0 0 
Red 15 10 9 15 0 0 0 0 
Yellow 25 22 22 25 0 0 0 0 
Green 21 24 23 22 0 0 0 0 
White 27 27 25 25 10 19 20 12 
--- 145 134 137 108 355 346 345 283      
Irwin Polk 
Black 157 166 167 179 154 176 176 182 
Red 10 16 17 14 15 10 10 11 
Yellow 17 25 26 18 29 26 25 31 
Green 17 19 17 16 25 23 23 30 
White 25 20 20 22 28 27 25 26 
--- 140 119 118 112 114 103 106 79     
Jackson USAFA 
Black 116 133 131 132 26 59 65 41 
Red 16 10 11 15 16 16 13 11 
Yellow 23 24 23 20 25 27 26 20 
Green 19 17 17 25 24 15 15 30 
White 24 27 27 24 26 14 14 20 
--- 167 154 156 131 248 234 232 224     
Lackland USMA 
Black 207 226 225 235 13 20 20 17 
Red 17 8 10 13 10 21 22 13 
Yellow 23 20 18 21 22 38 37 17 
Green 19 28 28 22 26 23 21 23 
White 22 25 24 19 31 22 24 26 
--- 77 58 60 50 262 241 241 245     
Parris USNA 
Black 117 133 132 132 23 44 37 28 
Red 21 22 23 20 13 13 38 25 
Yellow 32 27 26 29 28 22 24 27 
Green 26 25 24 31 32 15 14 30 
White 35 39 37 28 29 20 23 26 
--- 135 119 123 106 242 228 229 221 
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Figure 13a-c: The increase in extreme heat conditions at the military academies: 
(a) Air Force, (b) Army, and (c) Navy. The increase will limit available training 
time during the critical summer months.
Figure 13a-c: The increase in extreme heat conditions at the military academies: 
(a) Air Force, (b) Army, and (c) Navy. The increase will limit available training 
time during the critical summer months.
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Figure 14: Change in Flag Day distribution at Fort Benning, GA 
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